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I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding the level of detail and complexity attained in
many legal texts, any judge will agree that occasionally a statute or
administrative rule offers little guidance as to its appropriate applica-
tion to actual fact patterns. This dissonance should be the cause of
neither surprise nor dismay. Some lack of guidance is a natural out-
growth as drafters of legal texts cannot foresee all possible future
fact patterns. For this reason their rules tend to be general. After
all, it is precisely the function of a judge to help the law bridge the
gap from legal principles and texts to fact situations. If legal rules
were self-articulating, human judges would be unnecessary in most
cases; computers can solve simple syllogisms.
Nonetheless, it is true that some legal rules are more deficient in
the guidance they offer than others. That quite naturally leads to lit-
igation concerning the meaning of the text. One such text is rule
10b-5 (10b-5),' promulgated under section 10(b)2 of the Securities Ex-
1. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
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change Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).3 The rule is drafted in a manner
seemingly calculated to produce disputes over its interpretation; if
that is what the drafters intended, their wishes have been long ful-
filled. The quantity of interpretive law on nearly every aspect of 10b-
5 is staggering.4
The purpose of this article is to sort through one particularly con-
fusing area of rule 10b-5 in order to develop a coherent and correct
understanding of that part of the law. The topic of this article is the
requirement that the deceptive or manipulative act 5 be "in connec-
tion with" the purchase or sale of securities. Because of the way in
which 10b-5 is formulated, it is not enough that the defendant have
committed one of the many "bad acts" thought to be actionable under
the rule. Rather, the defendant's bad act must have been made "in
connection with the purchase or sale of . .. securit[ies]."6 Neither
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
2. Section 10 states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
3. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
4. Aside from the massive number of cases decided under rule 1Ob-5 and the star-
tling quantity of literature in the journals, there are at least two treatises devoted pri-
marily to rule 10b-5. See A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND
COMMODITIES FRAUD (1979); A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5
(2d ed. 1981). The development of this jurisprudence has been briefly traced else-
where. See Fletcher, Learning to Live With the Federal Arbitration Act-Securities
Litigation in a Post-McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99, 126 n.147 (1988).
5. Rule 10b-5 itself purports to proscribe much more than deceptive and manipu-
lative acts. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the rule can proscribe no more
than that prohibited by section 10(b), which the rule seeks to interpret; section 10(b)
proscribes only deceptive and manipulative acts. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 472-74 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988) (emphasis added); see L. SODERQUIST, UNDER-
STANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 252 (1987).
fraud nor the purchase or sale of securities will yield a 10b-5 violation
unless the fraud was in connection with the purchase or sale. This
article addresses the problem involved in determining when the
fraud is in fact in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.
The problem can be best understood by looking at two hypothetical
scenarios. In scenario A, imagine a vendor of common stocks. The
vendor is in the business of selling shares of stock in publicly held
corporations. In an effort to induce a victim into buying some shares
in XYZ Corporation, the vendor lies to the victim by stating that
XYZ Corporation is a major computer manufacturer whose sales and
earnings have doubled every year for the past ten years. In fact, the
vendor knows that XYZ is a shell corporation with no present assets,
sales, or earnings history and no prospects for any in the future. In
reliance on the lies, the victim buys XYZ Corporation stock from the
vendor.
In scenario B, imagine a shoe salesman who is also an active stock
trader. The salesman often knowingly and intentionally lies to his
customers about the quality of the leather in the shoes he sells. In
reliance on these lies many customers buy his shoddy shoes. The
salesman also sometimes sells securities to his shoe customers. How-
ever, the salesman is scrupulously honest when it comes to buying
and selling securities, making truthful and complete disclosure to the
extent the law requires.
In scenario A, the vendor has committed a clear violation of 10b-5;7
in scenario B, the shoe salesman has clearly not violated 10b-5. Yet
in both cases, fraud exists in the form of misrepresentations with sci-
enter, and a sale of securities has been consummated. The element
present in scenario A which is absent in scenario B is a link between
the two. In scenario B, the fraud was simply not in connection with
the sale of securities.
The challenge posed by the "in connection with" requirement of
10b-5 is coming up with a legitimating theory that will separate the
scenario A's of the world from the scenario B's. These two scenarios
are simple because they exist at the opposite ends of the "in connec-
tion with" spectrum. The task of creating and applying a rational "in
7. Courts, understandably, have never had any trouble coming to the conclusion
that a person's misrepresentations concerning a security, made in an attempt to sell
the security at a higher price than would be otherwise attainable, is deception "in con-
nection with" the sale of the security. See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (false prospectus and registration statement); Imperial Supply
Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339, 362-63 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (misleading
statements in sales claims). See generally Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate
Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA.
L. REV. 1271, 1292-95 (1965). The same is true of misrepresentations made for purposes
of inducing securities holders to sell. See, e.g., Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp.
1228, 1236-38 (D. Del. 1978) (deceptive tender offers).
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connection with" theory becomes more difficult as factual situations
approach the middle of the spectrum. The purpose of this article is
to create a theory of the "in connection with" requirement that will
explain adequately the difference between scenario A and B, as well
as those scenarios in the center of the spectrum. Up to now, there
has been only confusion on this point,8 a fact bemoaned by many
judges9 and commentators.1 0
The importance of the "in connection with" requirement is height-
ened because it appears in other statutory contexts as well; for exam-
ple, section 14(e) of the 1934 Act proscribes fraudulent conduct in
connection with tender offers.11 Although this article will focus ex-
clusively on 10b-5, much of what will be said can be applied to the
tender offer context as well.
Part II of this article sets the stage for a discussion of the "in con-
nection with" requirement by making clear the relationship of that
requirement to other elements of the 10b-5 offense. Part III then
presents a chronology of the development of the '"in connection with"
requirement, demonstrating an expansion and contraction that paral-
lels that of 10b-5's scope as interpreted by the judiciary.
Part IV offers a topical analysis of the "in connection with" re-
quirement, demonstrating that much of the difficulty in interpreta-
tion stems from the multiplicity of fact situations in which the
requirement arises. This problem has been exacerbated by an appar-
ent unawareness by the judiciary that the "in connection with" re-
quirement necessarily calls upon judges to vary their analyses
depending upon the type of case involved. For example, corporate
mismanagement cases must be treated differently from misappropria-
tion/insider trading cases when analyzing the degree of connection
8. There have been a few attempts to sort through the confusion. See, e.g., Note,
SEC Rule lOb-5-"In Connection With the Purchase or Sale of Any Security" Restric-
tion: Need for Analytical Precision, 5 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. No. 2, 28 (1969);
Note, The Pendulum Swings Farther: The "In Connection With" Requirement and
Pretrial Dismissals of Rule 10b-5 Private Claims for Damages, 56 TEX. L. REV. 62
(1977) [hereinafter Note, The Pendulum Swings Farther].
9. See, e.g., Buffo v. Graddick, 742 F.2d 592, 596 (11th Cir. 1984); Liberty Nat'l Ins.
Holding Co. v. The Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 555 (11th Cir. 1984); Rand v. Anaconda
Ericsson, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 176, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 579 (1986).
10. See, e.g., 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 38.01, at 2-41; L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 903-04 (1983); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1047 (5th ed. 1982); Note, The Pendulum Swings Farther,
supra note 8, at 68-69.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(e) (1982).
between the deception and the purchase or sale of securities. This
point is discussed more fully below.12
Part V sorts through the various analyses by courts and commenta-
tors and draws principles of distinction between those cases in which
the fraud is in connection with the purchase or sale of securities from
those cases in which the necessary connection is lacking. Part V also
offers guidance for the future interpretation of the "in connection
with" requirement in various factual settings.
Finally, part VI concludes that the interpretive conundrum
presented by the "in connection with" requirement results from an
unfortunate promulgation of substanceless legal rules by Congress
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These rules
force judges to assume a role they should not assume, impose uncer-
tainty costs upon the mechanisms of capital formation, and fail to
give notice to potential defendants (who may be criminally liable for
violations of 10b-5) of the prospect of their liability under the federal
securities laws. This article asserts that congressional or SEC action
is needed to specify the type of. connection required between the
"fraud" involved and the purchase or sale of securities. Although the
implications of some of the ideas presented are wide-reaching, and
although broad questions are raised regarding statutory interpreta-
tion and the proper relationship between the judiciary and the legis-
lature, this article does not set forth an elaborate theory about what
types of activities involving securities should be prohibited. In a
sense, the focus is much narrower: given the statute and the rule,
how should courts interpret them? And given the confusion that
reigns in the case law, what should Congress do about it?
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE "IN CONNECTION WITH"
REQUIREMENT TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF RULE 1OB-5
To understand the "in connection with" requirement, one must un-
derstand its place in 10b-5 analysis. More specifically, one must un-
derstand how the "in connection with" requirement relates to six
other elements of 10b-5. A comprehensive understanding of the rela-
tionship between those elements greatly facilitates the proper under-
standing of the "in connection with" requirement. Those six
elements are: (1) the fraud element; (2) materiality; (3) the purchase
or sale requirement; (4) causation; (5) reliance; and (6) damages.13
Broken down into its component parts, a private damage action
under 10b-5 has several elements. There must be "fraud" in the
12. See infra notes 161-226 and accompanying text.
13. See Note, The Pendulum Swings Farther, supra note 8, at 71-72 (citations
omitted).
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sense of either deception or manipulation. 14 Since "manipulation" is
"virtually a term of art" describing such practices as false touts and
matched buy/sell orders,15 most 10b-5 fraud involves deception. The
deception cases require, as a subset of the fraud element, that the de-
ception be material-that is, a "reasonable [person] would attach im-
portance [to the fact represented] in determining his choice of action
in the transaction in question."16 In addition, of course, after Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder17 and Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission,'8 the deception must have been made with scienter to sat-
isfy the fraud element.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,19 the United States
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a 10b-5 action must have actu-
ally purchased or sold securities, 20 firmly imbedding another ele-
ment-the purchaser/seller requirement-into 10b-5 actions.
Because of 10b-5's textual requirement that the fraud involved be in
connection with "the purchase or sale of any security", 2' the pur-
chaser/seller requirement clearly extends to SEC enforcement ac-
tions and criminal actions, as well as private damage actions
represented by Blue Chip Stamps.22 The rule requires that there be
a purchase or sale; Blue Chip Stamps requires that the plaintiff in a
private damage action be the purchaser or seller.
The other elements of the 10b-5 private damage action are not re-
quired in criminal or SEC enforcement actions. Two of them-reli-
ance and causation-are intimately tied to one another. More
specifically, reliance is a subset of the causation requirement. The
plaintiff generally establishes causation by showing that he relied on
14. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977).
15. See id. at 476 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
16. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. List
v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); accord Little v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218, 222 (9th
Cir. 1981) (Facts are material if "there is a substantial likelihood that an ordinary in-
vestor would have considered them important in deciding whether or not to purchase
the securities."). See also Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (stat-
ing materiality encompasses those facts that "in reasonable and objective contempla-
tion might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities").
17. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
18. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
19. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
20. Id. at 754-55.
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
22. Thus, Blue Chip Stamps is best seen as imposing a non-textually based stand-
ing requirement. See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.3,
at 450-57 (1985).
the alleged misrepresentation involved.23 There are exceptions, for
example, when the deception occurs as a result of non-disclosure 24 or
when the plaintiff alleges fraud on the market.25 In such cases, a
showing of reliance is unnecessary to establish the causation element.
Finally, for a private damage action to be successful, the plaintiff
must plead and prove damages. That is, the thing "caused" must
have been some harm to the plaintiff.26
Having seen what the elements of the 10b-5 action are, an exami-
nation of their interrelationship and interplay with the "in connec-
tion with" requirement is appropriate. The following diagram
illustrates the relationships between the elements:
FRAUD < - - - - - - IN CONNECTION WITH-- - -> PURCHASE OR SALE
(incl. materiality OF SECURITIES
and scienter)41
CAUSATION-------- - DAMAGES -.------ > CAUSATION
(incl. reliance) (incl. reliance)
The "in connection with" factor requires that there be a nexus be-
tween the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of securities. 27 It is
important to distinguish the role played by the "in connection with"
requirement from that of causation and its subsidiary requirement,
reliance.28 Whereas the "in connection with" element requires a
nexus between the fraud and the purchase or sale of securities, the
causation element requires a nexus between the fraud and the dam-
ages or between the purchase or sale and the damages. 29
This distinction between the "in connection with" requirement and
23. See, e.g., Gottreich v. San Francisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1977)
(stating that plaintiffs "relied on the misrepresentations; thus causation is adequately
alleged").
24. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (materi-
ality substitutes for reliance to establish causation where the deception was through
non-disclosure, rather than affirmative misrepresentation, in face-to-face transactions).
25. In the "fraud on the market" theory, the plaintiff establishes causation by
proving that he relied on the market to set an accurate price for the security based on
all available public information, and that the market relied on the misrepresentation
of the defendants, setting a higher or lower price than the market would have set
without the misrepresentation. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir.
1986). See generally T. HAZEN, supra note 22, § 13.5, at 465-66 (describing fraud on the
market theory and its basis in efficient market theory). In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108
S. Ct. 978 (1988), a plurality of the United States Supreme Court adopted the fraud on
the market theory.
26. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 (6th Cir.
1979).
27. See, e.g., In re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litig., 796 F.2d 1126, 1130
(9th Cir. 1986); First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1315 (5th Cir. 1977);
Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
28. As pointed out above, in the proper case, materiality may do double duty as a
subset of both the fraud element and the causation element. See supra note 25.
29. Accord 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 10, § 38.01[b], at 2-42.
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the causation requirement was hinted at by Justice Douglas in Super-
intendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.:30 "The crux
of the present case is that Manhattan suffered an injury as a result of
deceptive practices touching its sale of securities .... "31 The state-
ment that the injury occurred "as a result of" deceptive practices
concerns causation; the statement that the deceptive practices
"touched" the sale of securities concerns the "in -connection with"
requirement.32
The distinction is important not only to facilitate a conceptualiza-
tion of the "in connection with" requirement and its place in 10b-5
analysis, but also to prevent potential confusion resulting from the
infiltration of all the conceptual problems attending causation analy-
sis in 10b-5 cases. 33 Proper segregation of causation from the "in
connection with" analysis avoids this conundrum.
One recent case illustrates the confusion resulting from not suffi-
ciently distinguishing causation and the "in connection with" require-
ment. In Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,34 the Ninth
Circuit confused the two requirements, stating that the "in connec-
tion with" element requires a "causal relationship between the fraud
and the resulting injury. ' 35 This is obviously incorrect; the "in con-
nection with" requirement is an element of both private damage ac-
tions and criminal or SEC enforcement actions. In the latter, no
injury need be shown at all; thus, the "in connection with" require-
ment cannot require a showing of a causal connection to some injury.
Unfortunately, some courts and commentators have fostered confu-
sion between the two elements of 10b-5 by treating the distinction as
a difference between "loss causation" and "transaction causation."36
What is described as "loss causation" is nothing more than an identi-
fication of the causal factor (i.e., causation in the everyday sense);
30. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
31. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
32. See Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339, 363 (N.D.
Ohio 1976) (reporting argument of counsel).
33. See generally T. HAZEN, supra note 22, §§ 13.5-.6, at 461-69; L. Loss, supra note
10, at 1126-32; Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under Rule 10b-5, 9 SEC. REG. L. REV.
99 (1981).
34. 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988).
35. Id. at 150 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989 (1988)).
36. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); T. HAZEN, supra note 22, § 13.6, at 467; Crane,
supra note 33, at 100; Note, The Pendulum Swings Farther, supra note 8, at 62-65. See
generally Note, Loss and Transaction Causation: The Second Circuit Resolves the Cau-
sation Controversy in Majority Control Situations, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 693 (1975).
"transaction causation" is simply a misleading phraseology describing
the "in connection with" requirement. Professor Hazen's description
of the two supposed types of causation actually illustrates the two
separate elements-causation and the "in connection with"
requirement:
To begin with, the plaintiff must prove "transaction causation" which means
that but for the wrongful conduct, the transaction would not have gone
through.... Secondly, the plaintiff must be able to prove "loss causation"-
namely that the plaintiff's injury . . .is directly attributable to both the
wrongful conduct and the form and manner in which the challenged transac-
tion occurred. 3
7
Discussing the "in connection with" requirement in terms of "trans-
action causation" is misleading. As discussed at length below, the "in
connection with" requirement entails much more (and sometimes
much less) than causation. Perhaps for this reason, some observers
understandably find the distinction between loss causation and trans-
action causation unhelpful.38
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "IN CONNECTION
WITH" REQUIREMENT
Just as an appreciation of the relationship between the "in connec-
tion with" requirement and other elements of 10b-5 facilitates an un-
derstanding of the rule, awareness of the historical development of
the "in connection with" requirement aids in understanding proper
analysis of the requirement.
A. The Legacy of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.
Given that the "in connection with" requirement is the linchpin be-
tween fraudulent conduct and the purchase or sale of securities, and
given the amount of litigation concerning the requirement, the fact
that there is only one Supreme Court case addressing the require-
ment, the 1971 case of Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co.,39 is astounding. Yet the history of the "in connection
with" requirement began almost twenty years before, in the 1952 case
of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.40
Birnbaum is best known for holding that a plaintiff in a 10b-5 ac-
tion must be an actual purchaser or seller of securities4 1-a holding
37. T. HAZEN, supra note 22, § 13.6, at 467.
38. See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
562 F.2d 1040, 1048 n.11 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, supra note 10, at 1047-48.
39. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). As discussed infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text, most
recent cases, including the Blue Chip Stamps case, arguably cut back on Bankers Lfe
significantly.
40. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
41. Id. at 463.
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that was adopted by the Supreme Court in the Blue Chip Stamps
case. 42 However, the Birnbaum court went much further, concluding
that 10b-5 is directed only at that type of misrepresentation or fraud-
ulent practice normally associated with the sale or purchase of secur-
ities, not at corporate mismanagement, even if fraudulent.43
There are two possible interpretations of this second holding. The
first is as a non-textually based, policy-oriented limitation on 10b-5's
application. That is, the court may have been limiting the application
of 10b-5 in conformity with the perceived motivating principles for
the rule.44 But the court also seems to have been making two state-
ments, one negative and one positive, about the "in connection with"
requirement. First, the court seems to suggest that fraud will never
be in connection with a purchase or sale of securities for purposes of
10b-5, if the fraud is nothing more than egregious corporate misman-
agement actionable under state law. This view implies that Birn-
baum is the doctrinal grandfather of modern interpretations of the
"in connection with" requirement; which suggests that not just any
fraud that happens to involve a purchase or sale of securities will sat-
isfy the requirement.45
The other, more positive statement seemingly made in Birnbaum
concerns when the requirement will be satisfied. The court suggests
that deception or manipulation will be in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities only if that deception or manipulation is
of a type "normally associated" with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties. This reading of the "in connection with" requirement has
passed into obscurity in the current case law. Nonetheless, it repre-
sents an early attempt to define the scope of an intellectually baffling
nexus requirement. As will be seen, the "normally associated" test of
Birnbaum is just one of many that courts have used through the
years.46
B. The Supreme Court Speaks: Bankers Life and the "Touch" Test
Curiously, the most widely discussed "test" for determining when
the "in connection with" requirement is satisfied was not intended to
42. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
43. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 464.
44. The proper use of background principles in the application of statutory texts is
discussed elsewhere. See Fletcher, Principlist Models in the Analysis of Constitu-
tional and Statutory Texts, 72 IOWA L. REV. 891 (1987).
45. See infra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
46. See infra part IV.
be a test at all. In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co.,47 the United States Supreme Court unanimously held
that the deception involved in that case was in connection with the
purchase of securities involved. The defendants, managers of an in-
surance company, purchased the assets of the insurance company,
which consisted of marketable bonds. Through a sophisticated series
of transactions, the defendants paid for the bonds by borrowing
against them. Thus, the insurance company was left without any as-
sets and without compensation for the bonds it sold to the defend-
ants, a fact that the defendants sought to hide through complex
financing machinations.48 The New York Superintendent of Insur-
ance brought suit, claiming fraud in connection with the purchase of
the bonds in violation of 10b-5.49 The Supreme Court reversed the
Second Circuit, holding that the complaint stated a cognizable claim
under 10b-5.50
It was not the facts or holding that caught the attention of lower
courts. Rather, it was Justice Douglas's summary statement of the
Court's rationale: "The crux of the present case is that [the insur-
ance company] suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices
touching its sale of securities .... 51
The Court rejected by clear implication any suggestion that the "in
connection with" requirement necessitated a showing that the decep-
tion relate to the value of the security being purchased. 52 Although
nothing suggests that such a showing was required before Bankers
Life,53 recent cases have followed the Supreme Court's lead in cut-
ting back the expansion of 10b-5 by requiring such a showing.54 The
holding in Bankers Life is unremarkable, though, and the Court's
unanimity is not surprising; the Court specifically found that the in-
surance company, an investor in the bonds, had been deceived by its
management into believing that it would receive the proceeds from
the bond sale.55 This finding by the Court was suspect considering
47. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
48. Id. at 7-9.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id. at 13-14.
51. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
52. See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 763 (5th Cir. 1974).
53. The trial court listed four ways in which the "in connection with" requirement
could be satisfied, only one of which had to do with deception regarding the value of
the securities themselves. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
300 F. Supp. 1083, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404
U.S. 6 (1971). The trial court correctly stated the law as it existed then. See also 5 A.
JACOBS, supra note 4, § 117.01, at 5-71. The matter is now well settled. See, e.g., T.
HAZEN, supra note 22, § 13.6, at 119 (Supp. 1988). "The 'in connection' with require-
ment is not limited to fraud relating to the merits of a particular security." Id.
54. See inkfra notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
55. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 9-10.
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the contrary factual findings of the trial court.56 But the Court's
reading of the facts, even though suspect, makes the case a simple
one in which a seller of securities was deceived by the buyer into
parting with his securities for no consideration. This characterization
seems to fit squarely within the terms of 10b-5.57
In addition, the case represents a less expansive reading of the "in
connection with" requirement than may be apparent. The Court reit-
erated the Birnbaum position 58 that 10b-5 does not reach complaints
involving nothing more than internal corporate mismanagement. 59
The Court simply reaffirmed a common sense proposition--deception
of an investor, inducing him into a securities transaction for the pur-
pose of swindling him, is no less actionable under 10b-5 simply be-
cause the facts indicate corporate mismanagement. 60
C. Touching in the Lower Courts
Apparently overlooking the mundane holding in Bankers Life and
its partial reaffirmation of the Birnbaum decision, lower courts have
56. The trial court had found that neither the trading process nor the investing
public had been harmed, and that therefore the purposes behind section 10(b) would
not be served by application in that case. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970),
rev'd, 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The Second Circuit specifically adopted that finding in its rea-
soning. See Bankers Life, 430 F.2d at 361.
57. The fact that an actual purchase and sale took place distinguishes Bankers Life
from cases in which the securities are simply converted without any pretense of a
purchase. In the latter case, the deception is generally held not to be in connection
with any purchase or sale. See, e.g., Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 1986) (con-
version does not bring federal law into play); Bochicchio v. Smith Barney, Harris,
Upham & Co., 647 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (conversion, even occurring from
brokerage account, does not state a claim under 10b-5); Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599
F. Supp. 1563, 1564-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (no claim stated under.10b-5 where misrepresen-
tation is limited to mechanics of sale rather than inducement to buy); cf T. HAZEN,
supra note 22, § 13.6, at 120 (Supp. 1988). "Thus, a conversion of securities will not
support a 10b-5 claim without a showing that it was fraudulently induced." Id.
58. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
59. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12.
60. See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1282 (2d Cir.) (federal
securities laws confer jurisdiction for instances of corporate mismanagement where
fraud is intrinsic to securities transactions), reh'g en banc denied, 533 F.2d 1309 (2d
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (assertions of
corporate mismanagement will not cut off federal remedy); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d
714, 718 (2d Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 808 (5th Cir. 1970) (corporate
mismanagement does not immunize lOb-5 violations); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872,
881 (5th Cir. 1970) (immaterial that violation is part of a larger scheme of corporate
mismanagement). See generally Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539, 543-44
(N.D. Ill. 1970); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
seized upon the "touching" language from the opinion and have
adopted it as the cornerstone for "in connection with" cases. Most
commentators agree that the almost cavalier way in which the Bank-
ers Life Court reached its holding indicates a shift toward a more ex-
pansive reading of the "in connection with" requirement than
previously was given. 61
Thus, many courts read the purported "touching" test as a de
minimis requirement. For example, in Sargent v. Genesco, Inc.,62 the
court stated that the Bankers Life case "establishes that the defend-
ant's fraudulent conduct need not specifically relate to the plaintiff's
securities transaction as in a misrepresentation involving the value of
securities purchased or sold by the plaintiff. Instead, the requisite
nexus exists if such conduct merely touches upon the plaintiff's
purchase or sale." 63 Sargent is typical of many cases in which courts
interpret the touching test broadly. 64 As a result, after Bankers Life,
there was widespread agreement that the "in connection with" re-
quirement was to be interpreted loosely.65
The development of an early consensus of a broad touch test is cu-
rious, given that the concept of touching is neutral as to how close a
nexus is required. Thus, it could be asserted that the "in connection
with" requirement is satisfied because it requires only that the fraud
and the sale of securities touch, or that the "in connection with" re-
quirement is not satisfied because the fraud and the purchase or sale
must actually touch. As the court pointed out in Natowitz v. Mehl-
man,66 the touch test of Bankers Life is sufficiently ambiguous to be
interpreted as broadly or narrowly as necessary to achieve a desired
61. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 117.01, at 5-72; L. SODERQUIST, supra note 6, at
253. "The looseness of the 'touching' formulation, and the almost summary way in
which the Supreme Court disposed of the case, seemed to send a clear signal to lower
courts that they were to continue to interpret Rule 10b-5 expansively." Id. See also A.
JACOBS, supra note 4, § 38.01, at 2-45 (stating that Bankers Life "shows that Court's
approval of a loose nexus between the fraud and the purchase .and sale").
62. 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
63. Id. at 763.
64. See, e.g., Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Hor-
wath, 516 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that touch test is "broad"); Corbey v.
Grace, 605 F. Supp. 247, 252 (D. Minn. 1985) (asserting fraud "need only touch" the
sale or purchase of securities); cf. McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 467
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981) (using touch test as rationale for interpret-
ing "in connection with" requirement broadly).
65. See, e.g., Buffo v. Graddick, 742 F.2d 592, 596 (11th Cir. 1984); Ketchum v.
Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1026 (3d Cir.) (reporting trend), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977);
First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1315 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied,
564 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); T. HAZEN, supra note 22,
§ 13.6, at 470; L. SODERQUIST, supra note 6, at 253; Recent Decision, 46 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 482, 487 (1978) (discussing Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 940 (1977)).
66. 567 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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result.67 To say that two things must touch gives no guidance.
More recent decisions recognize this fact and correctly note that
the touching language from the Bankers Life opinion has been ac-
corded too much importance: it was nothing more than Justice
Douglas's literary style in restating the "in connection with" require-
ment and describing the outcome of the case.68 With the touch test
itself ambiguous, 69 courts suggest that the "in connection with" in-
quiry must be made on a case-by-case basis.70 Presumably, they con-
sider themselves free to judge the nexus in the case before them
unrestrained by the touching language of Bankers Life.
These more recent cases represent a general trend recognizing
there are limits to the extent 10b-5 can be used to remedy unlawful
conduct tangentially involving securities transactions. To the extent
Bankers Life calls for an expansive application of 10b-5, its historical
context must be considered. This case was decided during the heyday
of 10b-5, before Supreme Court cases of the mid-1970s limited the
rule's expansion. 71 As Jacobs points out: "The relatively narrow
reading on policy grounds the Supreme Court gave in 1977 to the 10b-
5 mismanagement cause of action permits lower courts, in close cases,
to decide that the 'touching' test is not met."72 One commentator
even suggests that more recent Supreme Court cases make the Bank-
67. Id. at 946.
68. See In re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litig., 796 F.2d 1126, 1130 (9th
Cir. 1986) (touch test nothing more than a restatement of the "in connection with" re-
quirement); Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 942 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp.
339, 361 (N.D. Ohio 1976); see also L. Loss, supra note 10, at 903-04.
69. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595 & n.18 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Natowitz v. Mehlman, 567 F. Supp. 942, 946 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
70. See Buffo v. Graddick, 742 F.2d 592, 596 (11th Cir. 1984); Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595 & n.18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974);
Natowitz v. Mehlman, 567 F. Supp. 942, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also 5 A. JACOBS,
supra note 4, § 38.01[b], at 2-46 (suggesting case-by-case approach); Jacobs, The Role of
the Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 27, 43 (1973) (suggesting case-by-case approach).
71. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
72. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 117.01, at 5-73; see also L. SODERQUIST, supra note
6, at 253 (suggesting that the expansive interpretation of Bankers Life began to wane
after Blue Chip Stamps and Ernst & Ernst, thus making later cases more important in
analyzing the "in connection with" requirement, i.e., Brown v. Ivie, 661 F.2d 62 (5th
Cir. 1981); Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1977)).
ers Life touch test of "dubious continuing vitality." 73
In line with these Supreme Court cases, courts and commentators
alike have begun to reject any suggestion that the "in connection
with" requirement imposes merely a de minimis touching require-
ment.74 One such case, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,75
makes it clear that the "in connection with" requirement requires
more touching than simply a light caress.
In Blue Chip Stamps, the defendant (a distributor of trading
stamps) entered into an antitrust consent decree with the Justice De-
partment. The terms of the consent decree required Blue Chip
Stamps to offer stock in itself to retailers who were previous buyers
of the stamps. 76 The retailer-plaintiffs, who had been offered stock
in Blue Chip Stamps, allegedly declined to purchase because Blue
Chip Stamps fraudulently and pessimistically misrepresented its fi-
nancial condition.77
The Supreme Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim
under 10b-5, since the plaintiffs were not purchasers or sellers of se-
curities. 78 The plaintiffs argued that the "in connection with" lan-
guage of 10b-5 justified extending the rule to fraud in offers, which
necessarily precede purchases or sales.79 However, the Court re-
jected this expansive reading of the requirement.8 0 There was an al-
legation of misrepresentation by Blue Chip Stamps and there was no
question that Blue Chip Stamps sold securities. Nonetheless, the
court found no 10b-5 violation. One reading of the case is that it re-
jected any de minimis touch test.
Although broad generalizations can be made concerning the expan-
sion and subsequent contraction of the "in connection with" require-
ment over time, the most compelling feature of the case law is the
resultant state of confusion. Courts simply have been unable to artic-
73. See Note, The Pendulum Swings Farther, supra note 8, at 67; see supra note 71
for three such cases.
74. See, e.g., Head v. Head, 759 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1985):
The Bankers Life "de minimis touch test" might be read literally and expan-
sively to make any securities transaction actionable under Rule 10b-5 so long
as there was some deceptive practice remotely "touching" the transaction.
But we think the test could not have been intended to be applied in so unlim-
ited a way.
Id. at 1175 (citation omitted); see also Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726
F.2d 930, 942-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984) (stating that Bankers Life
"pushed the perimeters [of the in connection with requirement] rather far"); T. HA-
ZEN, supra note 22, § 13.6, at 120 (Supp. 1988) (de minimis touching no longer
sufficient).
75. 421 U.S. 723, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
76. Id. at 725-26.
77. Id. at 726-27.
78. Id. at 727, 755.
79. Id. at 731.
80. Id. at 757 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
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ulate principles for the interpretation and application of this require-
ment. The next two parts of this article attempt to remedy that
deficiency.
IV. THE CROSS-CATEGORICAL USE OF THE "IN CONNECTION
WITH" PRINCIPLES
One of the main causes of confusion when interpreting the "in con-
nection with" requirement is the explosive growth of 10b-5 to cover
vastly different types of transactions. As a result, the requirement
also comes under analysis in a wide variety of situations.8 ' The doc-
trinally diffuse nature of 10b-5 makes it impossible to establish com-
mon principles for universal application of the "in connection with"
requirement.
Nonetheless, courts seemingly have been unaware of the need for
varied principles of interpretation and application in different cases.
This section assembles a topical survey of six broad categories of
cases in which "in connection with" problems have arisen, and de-
scribes the approaches taken by various courts in interpreting this re-
quirement. The six categories are presented in roughly ascending
order of tenuousness in the connection between the bad act involved
and the resulting securities transaction. What becomes apparent is
that courts struggle to apply standards of interpretation borrowed
from factually dissimilar cases. Part V then attempts to dissipate the
confusion by establishing principles of interpretation for the various
types of cases.
A. Category 1: Paradigmatic Securities Fraud
The easiest category of cases to understand are those representing
the paradigm of securities fraud. Congress undoubtedly contem-
plated those cases when it enacted section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.8 2
The paradigmatic case is that in which a seller of securities, for the
purpose of inducing another to purchase those securities, deliberately
and affirmatively misleads the buyer in a matter that would clearly
81. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 38.01, at 2-50 to 2-55 & nn.32-55 (listing 24
types of cases in which "in connection with" requirement has been found to be satis-
fied); see also Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 651 F.2d 615,
619 (9th Cir. 1981) ("in connection with" requirement satisfied in many situations
outside of garden variety fraud).
82. The dearth of legislative history for section 10(b) and for rule 10b-5 is dis-
cussed iqfra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
influence the buyer's investment decision.8 3
1. The Principle of Greatest Possible Connection
Courts, not surprisingly, have had no trouble finding the fraud in-
volved to be in connection with the sale of securities in such cases.8 4
Also not surprising is the fact that courts make such findings without
much explanation of the principles that lead them to that conclusion.
Perhaps in the typical securities fraud case, the fraud and the
purchase or sale are as closely connected as they can possibly be.
Thus, when the case involves a situation in which one cannot imagine
a closer connection between the fraud and the purchase or sale, the
"in connection with" requirement is satisfied.
However, making such a statement is not particularly helpful (and
indeed may beg the question), since it does not indicate why a con-
nection exists at all in the paradigmatic case. A better description of
what constitutes a "connection" is needed. Such a task is best accom-
plished by articulating principles that will differentiate those cases in
which a connection exists from those in which one does not.
2. Causation Justifications
One court has justified a finding of connection in the paradigmatic
securities fraud situation in terms of causation. In Imperial Supply
Co., Inc. v. Northern Ohio Bank,85 the court stated that "[the proper
connection] is always present if it can be shown that the purchase or
sale of a security was induced by a scheme or artifice to defraud
.... "8 In other words, the paradigmatic case involves the required
83. The paradigmatic case also encompasses the reverse transaction, in which a
buyer misleads a seller in a similar manner. It was this reverse paradigm that moti-
vated the drafting of 10b-5. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws: Summations, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (statement of Mr. Milton Freeman).
84. See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 785-87 (2d Cir. 1951);
Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1236-38 (D. Del. 1978); Imperial Supply Co.
v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339, 362-63 (N.D. Ohio 1976); accord Fleischer,
supra note 7, at 1292 (noting that 10b-5 clearly applies when a corporation dissemi-
nates misleading information for the purpose of selling or buying securities).
85. 430 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
86. Id. at 362 n.14 (interpreting Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement, 507 F.2d 374 (2d
Cir. 1974)). The case also presented the more complex question of the liability to a
plaintiff who was a "forced seller" of securities in a tender offer. See id. at 362-63. The
"forced seller" doctrine is a subset of the "purchaser/seller" requirement and states
that an owner of securities who is forcibly cashed out in a merger transaction is a
"seller" of securities even though the investor did not make an investment decision to
sell in the transaction. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). That the plaintiff was a forced seller rather than a
voluntary one does not change the "in connection with" analysis, however. The ques-
tion simply becomes whether the misrepresentation was sufficiently connected with
the merger that ultimately resulted in the plaintiff's being forced to sell. See Imperial
Supply, 430 F. Supp. at 362-63.
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connection because the defendant acted with scienter and thereby in-
duced the plaintiff to enter into the transaction.
The same sort of explanation was given in a slightly different con-
text in Allen Organ Co. v. North American Rockwell Corp.87 In that
case, the parties had entered into a contract whereby the defendant
would provide the plaintiff with a license to manufacture artificial
sound-generating devices. 88 In exchange, the plaintiff gave the de-
fendant, among other things, securities issued by the plaintiff.8 9 The
plaintiff sued for breach of contract and violation of 10b-5 when the
sound-generating devices allegedly failed to work as represented by
the defendant.9 0 The court treated the case as a simple example of
misrepresentation by a securities buyer of the value of the considera-
tion being paid. It dealt with the "in connection with" requirement
as had the court in Imperial Supply9l by pointing out that, if the
plaintiff's allegations were true, the misrepresentation caused the se-
curities transaction to occur. 92 "Thus, if the value of the goods to be
exchanged has been misrepresented and has induced the transfer of
stock in exchange therefor, the 'in connection with the purchase and
sale of securities' requirement of Section 10(b) has clearly been
satisfied."93
As discussed in part V, there are several other principles that com-
bine to justify finding the requisite connection in category 1 cases.9 4
As will also be seen, the two principles discussed here-greatest pos-
sible connection and causation-which might explain the "in connec-
tion with" requirement in paradigmatic cases are of limited benefit in
other categories. One category of cases in which notions of causation
might be helpful is discussed in the next section.
87. 363 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The case is less a paradigm than that in-
volved in Imperial Supply because in Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp.,
363 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the misrepresentation alleged was not as to the com-
pany issuing the securities but as to the consideration paid for the securities. Id. at
1125.
88. Id. at 1120.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1120-21.
91. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
92. Allen Organ, 363 F. Supp. at 1128.
93. Id.
94. See infra notes 327-31 and accompanying text.
B. Category 2: Misrepresentation by Corporate Issuers Who Are
Not Buyers or Sellers in the Transaction
An examination of category 1 cases illustrates the clear connection
between the fraud and the securities transaction where the mis-
representer is also a buyer or seller. However, courts generally agree
that the issuer may be liable in some cases even though the issuer is
not a buyer or seller in the transaction that caused the plaintiff's
harm.95 This is simply an outgrowth of the general judicial rejection
of the notion that the defendant must be in privity with the plaintiff
or that the defendant must even be a buyer or seller at all. 96 Indeed,
third parties such as accountants, 97 brokers,98 and credit agencies
may commit fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties, even when those third parties are not themselves trading in the
securities. 99 As Professor Hazen has noted, "Any statement that is
reasonably calculated to affect the investment decision of a reason-
able investor will [be held to] satisfy the 'in connection with'
requirement. "100
The factual situation of category 2 is fairly common: a corporation
issues a statement about itself knowing it is false. Investors trade on
the basis of that misrepresentation and ultimately lose money when
the falsity of the representation comes to light. May those investors
claim that the misrepresentation of the corporation was in connec-
tion with the investor's trades even if the corporation itself was not a
purchaser or seller of securities? Certainly this connection is more
attenuated than that in category 1. More than twenty years ago, Ar-
thur Fleischer described the problem and the judicial response to
that problem as it had developed up to that time:
The applicability of rule 10b-5 to corporate reports when the corporation
has neither bought nor sold securities has been thought to raise special ques-
95. See, e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 913 (1979); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
Jabend, Inc. v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1339, 1343-44 (W.D. Wash. 1986);
SEC v. Penn Central Co., 450 F. Supp. 908, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Crofoot v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1154, 1158-59 (E.D. Cal. 1976); see also T. HAZEN, supra note 22,
§ 13.6, at 470 (summarizing case law); Fleischer, supra note 7, at 1292-94.
96. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 759-61 (5th Cir. 1974) (privity
not required, although its presence may indicate the requisite connection).
97. The special treatment of accountants is discussed infra notes 144-69 and ac-
companying text.
98. The special treatment of brokers is discussed infra notes 118-43 and accompa-
nying text.
99. See, e.g., SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 785 F.2d 38, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1986); Buffo v.
Graddick, 742 F.2d 592, 596-97 (11th Cir. 1984); First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson,
559 F.2d 1307, 1315 (5th Cir. 1977); Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975); Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599 F.
Supp. 1563, 1566 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
100. T. HAZEN, supra note 22, § 13.6, at 470.
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tions. Rule 10b-5 speaks in terms of fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security. Early cases intimated that a defrauded person had a rem-
edy only against the party from whom he bought, or to whom he sold, securi-
ties. However, this concept of "privity" has been rejected with increasing
frequency by the courts in recent cases and it would appear to be sufficient for
a cause of action under the rule that an investor bought or sold in reliance on
a misleading statement made by a defendant.1 0 1
Not surprisingly, given the more attenuated nature of the connec-
tion in category 2 cases, the case law analysis is more problematic. In
fact, in these third party liability cases, two distinct lines of analysis
are drawn. The first approach holds that for the "in connection
with" requirement to be satisfied, two critical elements must be
shown: causation/materiality02 and intent on the part of the mis-
representer that the statement be relied upon by the investor in de-
ciding to undertake the transaction. The other approach requires
only causation/materiality. Thus, the former is a subjective standard;
the latter is objective.
1. Causation/Materiality and Purpose/Intent
Professor Hazen's statement of the rule that courts apply in deal-
ing with misrepresentations by non-trading corporations10 3 is typical
of many such cases. Many courts require in such cases, as a condition
of finding the requisite connection, two distinct findings. First, the
corporation must have "calculated" that the misrepresentation would
be relied upon by investors. Second, the misrepresentation must
have caused the transaction either to be consummated (if the action
is by a private party) or to be of a type that would cause reasonable
investors to consummate a transaction (if the action is an administra-
tive or criminal enforcement action).10 4
The latter requirement is nothing more than an offshoot of the
analysis used in category 1 cases, with a special twist. In the category
1 cases, the connection might be found because the misrepresentation
by one party to the transaction caused the other party to engage in
the transaction. This idea is borrowed from non-trading corporation
101. Fleischer, supra note 7, at 1292-93. Fleischer went on to point out that the case
law generally has required some showing that the company intended the investing
public to rely on the misleading information. Id.
102. The close relationship between causation and materiality in this context is ex-
plored infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
Jabend, Inc. v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1339, 1343-44 (W.D. Wash. 1986);
Crofoot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1154, 1158-59 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
misrepresentation cases. But where the plaintiff is not a victim of
the misrepresentation (i.e., where the action is an administrative or
criminal enforcement action), courts have had to alter the causation
rationale and have done so in the same way as in Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States.1o5 Thus, courts have altered the reliance re-
quirement for face-to-face non-disclosure cases by speaking in terms
of materiality.106 To the extent that this causation/materiality re-
quirement is what supports the connection in such cases, the category
2 analysis is meaningfully different from the category 1 analysis.
The requirement of intent (i.e., that the misrepresenter's purpose
is to cause the transaction) on the part of the misrepresenting corpo-
ration distinguishes category 2 analysis from category 1. Fleischer
described this type of "in connection with" analysis in category 2
cases this way: "A company which knowingly releases a misleading
report for dissemination to the general public would also appear to be
liable under 10b-5 to those who rely on the information to their detri-
ment, at least where the reliance by the investing public is intended
by the company."'0 7
Most instances in which a corporation disseminates misleading in-
formation probably involve cases in which the corporation does not
intend that investors purchase or sell securities in reliance thereon.
Yet corporations have important incentives to affect the markets in
their securities by misleading the investing public. Thus, the ques-
tion of intent by the corporation becomes a subjective inquiry of
fact.108
Corporations normally have reasons--and very proper ones-for desiring that
the market place evaluate their securities in a fashion which they regard as
sensible. These reasons may include the dominant interests of their stock-
holders in price performance of their stock, the desire to make options attrac-
tive to key employees, and the need to have a security adequately priced for
possible acquisition purposes.1 0 9
There may be other reasons as well. For example, the corporation
may wish to keep the price of its stock depressed before the dissemi-
nation of good news to enable its insiders to buy large blocks of stock
before the market reflects that news.
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,11O the Second Circuit held that a
company that intentionally disseminates false information after cal-
culating that the investing public will enter into securities transac-
tions in reliance thereon has committed a deception that is in
105. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
106. Id. at 152-54.
107. Fleischer, supra note 7, at 1294 (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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connection with the investors' purchases and sales.l' The court
stated: "[W]e hold that Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions
are made, as here, in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the
investing public... if such assertions are false or are misleading or so
incomplete as to mislead."112 Thus, in cases in which a misleading
statement was made without contemplation by the party disseminat-
ing the statement that the investing public rely thereon, even when
the public might have actually relied on the misstatements, courts
have held that the necessary connection between the deception and
the purchase or sales is absent.113
The doctrinal progression from category 1 cases to category 2 cases
in which courts require not only causation (or materiality) but sub-
jective intent as well before finding the requisite nexus between the
fraud and the purchase or sale is important to note. In moving from
the end of the spectrum represented by category 1 cases, where the
connection is facially clear, to category 2 cases in which the connec-
tion is less facially clear, these courts have added a new element to
the "in connection with" inquiry-intent. In other words, a counter-
balancing move is being made doctrinally: in losing the obvious con-
nection of category 1 cases, rigor is gained in the "in connection with"
inquiry.
2. Causation/Materiality Alone
Not all cases make a counterbalancing move. In failing to do so,
they not only loosen the connection required, but they mistakenly as-
sume that the simple causation rationale that supports the connec-
tion in category 1 cases114 can support the connection in category 2
cases as well.
For example, in SEC v. Penn Central Co.,115 the court explicitly re-
jected the subjective standard enunciated in Texas Gulf Sulphur in
favor of a pure causation analysis: "We believe that the required
nexus [between the fraud and the purchase or sale of securities] is
most properly defined with reference to the concept of proximate
111. Id. at 862.
112. Id. The United States Supreme Court has approved, in dictum, this "causa-
tion/materiality plus intent" formulation. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978,
985 n.13 (1988).
113. See, e.g., Jabend, Inc. v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1339, 1343-44 (W.D.
Wash. 1986).
114. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
115. 450 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
cause."1 16 Other courts are less explicit in their rejection of the ob-
jective intent analysis but nonetheless state the inquiry as being
whether it was reasonably foreseeable that investors would be caused
to enter into a securities transaction.11 7
Missing from these cases is an explanation for the interpretation
that the misrepresentation was in connection with the transaction.
Although in the category 1 cases causation seems to be an adequate
explanation, in category 2 cases causation alone is a less satisfying ra-
tionale for 10b-5 liability. The inadequacy of the causation rationale
in category 2 cases may also indicate that causation alone is not the
complete rationale for finding the required nexus in category 1. Per-
haps category 1 cases are so compelling because of the confluence in
such cases of clear causation and the principle of greatest possible
connection. In category 2 cases, the principle of greatest possible con-
nection does not operate.
The proper approach in these category 2 cases is discussed in part
V. It is sufficient for present purposes to point out that the causation
rationale that seemed adequate in category 1 cases seems less so in
category 2 cases. Courts should not assume that inquiries that work
in one type of case will work in others.
C. Category 3: Third-Party Connections With the Purchase or Sale
of Securities
The third category of cases is related intimately to the second but
raises somewhat different problems. The third category is made up
of those cases in which the question is whether the securities transac-
tion involved was in connection with the activities of third parties
who were not buyers or seller of securities but whose deception af-
116. Id. at 913.
117. See, e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("in connec-
tion with" requirement satisfied when "it may reasonably be expected that a publicly
disseminated document will cause reasonable investors to buy or sell securities in reli-
ance thereon"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); SEC v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647, 650
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (10b-5 satisfied if it may reasonably be expected that a publicly dissem-
inated document will cause reasonable investors to buy or sell in reliance thereon); see
also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1978):
[T]he "in connection with" requirement of Rule 10b-5 imposes in these cases
the limitation that defendants can be liable for misrepresentations and omis-
sions only if the defendants could reasonably foresee that these misstatements
would be used in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Id. at 887 (footnote omitted); SEC v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 785 F.2d 38, 40-41 (2d Cir.
1986) (where misrepresentations by third party were of a type ordinarily relied upon
by investors, they were in connection with the sale of securities); Buffo v. Graddick,
742 F.2d 592, 596 (11th Cir. 1984) (one rationale for finding third party's misrepresenta-
tions to be in connection with purchases of securities was causal connection between
misrepresentations and the purchases); Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563,
1566 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("in connection with" requirement requires using device of a sort
that would cause reasonable investors to purchase or sell securities in reliance).
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fects securities transactions. This category is similar to the category 2
cases in that the party whose potential liability is under scrutiny is
not an actual buyer or seller of securities, but either makes state-
ments affecting the transaction decision or is otherwise involved in
the transaction. Category 3 cases raise special problems, however, be-
cause the defendant's connection with the transaction is of a different
type and arguably more attenuated. This arguably greater degree of
attenuation results from the fact that the defendant is not the issuer
of the securities. In contrast, in category 2 cases, the party who actu-
ally makes the misrepresentation is affecting the purchase and/or
sale of its own securities.
The greater degree of attenuation is only arguable; however, since
a broker or accountant may have incentives similar to those of the
issuing corporation in seeing the transactions go through at a
favorable price. In addition, one might argue that a broker's involve-
ment in a securities transaction is even greater than the issuer's,
given the broker's actual execution of the trades. At any rate, we can
say with confidence that the misrepresentations of a broker or ac-
countant raise different problems from those encountered when the
issuer makes the misrepresentation.
1. Brokers and the "In Connection With" Requirement
In examining cases that address whether the broker's action was in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, we find that the
case law is in confusion. Sometimes there is almost no rationale
given for a court's finding on the question. Where there is a rationale
given, it often does not square with rationales given in similar cases.
As with the category 2 cases, rationales are borrowed from other cat-
egories of cases without much apparent attention given to the dissim-
ilarities in the cases.
Typical in this regard is Landy v. FDIC,118 in which the Third Cir-
cuit borrowed its rationale from the category 2 cases. The plaintiffs,
investors in the securities of a bank, alleged that the bank president
misappropriated approximately $200,000 in bank funds and used the
money to engage in illegal and unprofitable stock transactions. The
losses from those transactions, the plaintiffs alleged, caused the bank
to become insolvent and caused their bank securities to decline in
value. Among the defendants named were the brokers who executed
the unlawful stock trades for the bank president.
118. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
The plaintiffs put forward two theories. First, they claimed that
the $200,000 worth of illegal purchases effectuated by the brokers
amounted to fraud in connection with the purchase of securities. The
court disposed of that argument by pointing out that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to complain about those transactions since they were
not purchasers or sellers in those transactions. 119
The plaintiffs also argued that the brokers' unlawful acts were in
connection with the plaintiffs' purchases of the bank's securities. As
the court framed the inquiry: "The pertinent question here is
whether the brokers' alleged acts were 'in connection with' plaintiffs'
purchase of [bank] shares."'120 The court found that there was
neither manipulation nor deception by the brokers that could be said
to be in connection with the purchase of those shares. The plaintiffs'
allegations were insufficient to support a manipulation claim, since
the plaintiffs had not alleged a "scheme deliberately calculated to
manipulate the market value" of the bank stock.121 The court then
dealt with the possibility of deception in connection with the bank
stock purchases by borrowing the analysis used in one subgroup of
category 2 cases. 122 "[A] scheme may be proscribed by rule 10b-5 if it
includes misrepresentations which may reasonably be relied upon by
the average investor in purchasing or selling the securities in ques-
tion."123 The court found the "in connection with" requirement un-
satisfied under that standard without even questioning the
applicability of the causation/materiality standard to the fact pattern
before it124 -- a fact pattern decidedly different from that involved in
the category 2 cases whence that standard arose. A similar rationale
was used in conjunction with several other rationales more recently
in Bosio v. Norbay Securities, Inc.,125 in which the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant brokerage firm sold securities pursuant to the
plaintiff's instructions but misappropriated the proceeds. The court
offered no fewer than four rationales for its finding that the "in con-
nection with" requirement was not satisfied. First, the court restated
the causation/materiality rationale from the category 2 cases: "It is
well established in this circuit that the 'in connection with' . . . re-
quirement of 10(b) requires using a device 'of a sort that would cause
reasonable investors to rely thereon, and [therefore] cause them to
purchase or sell a corporation's securities.' "126
119. Id. at 154-59.
120. Id. at 161.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 95-117 and accompanying text.
123. Landy, 486 F.2d at 161 (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. 599 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
126. Id. at 1566 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 16: 913, 1989] The "In Connection With" Requirement
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The court then offered three other rationales not seen in categories
1 and 2. Injecting a principle of temporal sequencing, the court noted
that the requisite connection was missing where the fraud did not
take place prior to or contemporaneously with the purchase or
sale.127 The court also suggested that misrepresentations concerning
the "mechanics" of the sale (as opposed to misrepresentations con-
cerning the securities themselves or the purpose for the sale) were
not in connection with that sale.128 Finally, the court suggested that
section 10(b)'s purpose was merely to ensure the integrity of investor
information, and that purpose was not impacted by the alleged mis-
representations concerning the broker's fidelity and competence.
This last rationale, stated without any survey of the legislative his-
tory of section 10(b),129 is one that recurs in the case law and implies
that a statute's application is limited by the scope of the principles
that motivated it. The tenuous basis for this rationale is explored
elsewhere. 130 The point here is merely that courts struggling with
articulating principles for the application of the "in connection with"
requirement put forth many possible rationales, generally without
much explanation for the bases of those rationales.
The failure to articulate a compelling standard for application of
the "in connection with" requirement has left the cases involving
brokers' transactions in disarray. Some courts have joined with the
Bosio court in suggesting that misrepresentations concerning the
mechanics of a purchase or sale, as opposed to misrepresentations
concerning the merits of a particular security, are not in connection
with that purchase or sale.131 Implicit in such reasoning is the princi-
127. Id. This principle of temporal sequencing is one that recurs in the case law.
See infra notes 299-304 and accompanying text. Although courts generally agree that
any misrepresentation must come before the securities transaction to be in connection
with it, there is no requirement that the transaction come immediately after the mis-
representation. See, e.g., Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
128. Id.
129. As discussed infra notes 250-54 and accompanying text, there is scant legisla-
tive history to guide application of section 10(b), and there is nothing in the legislative
history indicating that Congress was concerned solely with informational integrity.
130. See Fletcher, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Law, 1988
DUKE L.J. 1081, 1139-40; Fletcher, Principlist Models in the Analysis of Constitutional
and Statutory Texts, 72 IOWA L. REV. 891, 914-19 (1987).
131. See, e.g., Saxe v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1986) (allega-
tion that plaintiff was induced by defendant to liquidate his stock account and invest in
commodities did not state a claim under section 10(b), since plaintiff was never misled
about the stocks he sold); Nevitsky v. Manufacturers Hanover Brokerage Serv., 654 F.
Supp. 116, 119 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). "A misrepresentation concerning the mechanics of
a securities transaction, without particular regard to the nature of the securities them-
ple that only misrepresentations concerning the merits of a security
will satisfy the "in connection with" requirement. Often that princi-
ple is stated explicitly.132
Other courts in cases involving brokered transactions have either
explicitly or implicitly rejected such a principle, often without clearly
articulating any alternative principle.3i In Arrington v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,134 the Ninth Circuit held that a
broker's failure to inform a customer about the risks of margin ac-
counts constituted a misrepresentation in connection with the
purchase and sale of securities. 135 As a rationale, the court merely
noted that 10b-5 is to be read flexibly,136 and that the fraud need only
"touch" the securities transaction. 37
Some courts have also borrowed the causation rationale from cate-
gories 1 and 2. In Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,138
the Third Circuit rejected the principle that the misrepresentations
must go to the merits of a security rather than to the mechanics of
the process, by holding that misrepresentations concerning levels of
margin interest were in connection with the purchase of securities.139
The court explained that the touching requirement of Bankers Life
selves, is not actionable under section 10(b)." Id.; qf. T. HAZEN, supra note 22, § 13.6, at
120 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (not sufficient that alleged fraud in connection with commodi-
ties investments led plaintiff to liquidate securities holdings).
132. See, e.g., Saxe v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1986) (plain-
tiff's allegation that broker induced him, through misrepresentations, to liquidate his
stock portfolio and invest in commodities was not sufficient given the "in connection
with" requirement, since there was no allegation of misrepresentations concerning the
stocks that were sold); Bochicchio v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 647 F. Supp.
1426, 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (theft by broker of customer's securities sales proceeds not
fraud in connection with sale of the securities, since there was no misrepresentation
concerning any of the securities involved); Crummere v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham
& Co., 624 F. Supp. 751, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (deception that does not relate to specific
securities is not in connection with their purchase or sale).
133. Rejection of the principle does not always work against the broker. In the
seminal case of A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967), a broker was
suing a customer who allegedly placed an order for the purchase of securities in-
tending to pay for them only if they increased in value. The court held that such alle-
gations stated a claim under 10b-5, rejecting the suggestion of the defendant that 10b-5
could only be used when the alleged fraud concerned the investment value of the se-
curities. Id. at 396-97.
134. 651 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981).
135. Id. at 619.
136. Id. More thoughtful analysis has led some courts to conclude that the oft-re-
peated suggestion that 10b-5 is to be read flexibly, not restrictively, to protect investors
offers no real guidance. See, e.g., DMI Furniture, Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co., 644 F.
Supp. 1517, 1528 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
137. Arrington, 651 F.2d at 619; see also Corbey v. Grace, 605 F. Supp. 247, 252 (D.
Minn. 1985) (allegation of misstatements made by broker to entice customer to open
brokerage account, leading to purchases of securities for that account, stated claim
under 10b-5, since the misrepresentations need only "touch" the purchase or sale of
securities).
138. 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 267 (1985).
139. Id. at 941-44.
[Vol. 16: 913, 1989] The "In Connection With" Requirement
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
requires only some causal connection between the fraud and the
purchase or sale.140
Importantly, however, the court failed to note the differences be-
tween the case before it and those category 1 and 2 cases in which
causation plays so central a role in giving life to the "in connection
with" requirement. In both category 1 and category 2 cases, the cau-
sation is always supplemented by the fact that any misrepresenta-
tions go to the merits of the security being traded. The court's
exclusive reliance on causation is made even more curious by its ex-
plicit statement that 10b-5's purpose is to ensure the informational
integrity of investment decisions;141 a statement generally made by
courts in support of restricting the "in connection with" requirement
to cases in which the misrepresentations go to the merits of the se-
curities purchase.142
These broker transaction cases amply illustrate the confusion sur-
rounding application of the "in connection with" requirement. One
senses in reading cases such as these, that the courts are "eyeballing"
the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of securities and simply
assessing the degree to which there seems to be a closeness, nexus, or
a connection between the two. The rationales do not appear to be
steps in a reasoning process or tests that can be applied syllogisti-
cally; rather, they seem to be post facto explanations for findings the
judges are unable to explain in any other way. The "eyeballing" as-
sessment of transactional proximity may itself be a standard by
which the requisite connection between the fraud and the transaction
may be judged. Perhaps it is even an appropriate one, given the lack
of guidance provided by section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.143 Nonetheless,
if that is what is occurring, the courts should confront that fact and
address the method's legitimacy.
2. Misrepresentations by Accountants
Cases involving misrepresentations by accountants arguably in-
volve an even greater attenuation between the fraud and the
purchase or sale of securities than that found in the broker cases,
140. Id. at 943.
141. Id. at 942.
142. In fact, the case cited by the court in support of its informational integrity
statement was Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), in which
the informational problem (non-disclosure of material facts) concerned matters that
went to the value of the securities being sold.
143. The appropriateness of this form of inquiry is discussed infra note 314 and ac-
companying text.
since accountants do not actually effectuate transactions. However,
under proper circumstances they, too, have been held to act in con-
nection with a shareholder's securities transaction if they utter mis-
representations. The unifying feature of the cases in which liability
is found is a rejection of the principle that any misrepresentation
must concern the merits of a given security. The existence of unify-
ing features should not be exaggerated; the case law is in disarray,
both in the courts' willingness to subject accountants (acting in nor-
mal accountants' roles) to liability under 10b-5 and in the courts'
enunciation of principles for distinguishing cases in which the re-
quirement is satisfied from those in which it is not. The disarray in
the case law is amply demonstrated by an examination of the opin-
ions in three Second Circuit cases.
One panel in a 1986 case, SEC v. Drysdale Securities Corp.,144 sim-
ply borrowed the causation/materiality principle, holding that if an
accountant makes a misrepresentation of a type that reasonable in-
vestors are foreseeably likely to rely upon, that misrepresentation is
in connection with the investor's securities transaction.145 Cases such
as this are curious in their borrowing of the category 2 rationale. The
accountant's role as a non-trading speaker is similar to that of the
non-trading corporate issuer involved in category 2, but the former's
role is more attenuated than the latter's, since the alleged misrepre-
sentations made by an accountant do not necessarily go to the merits
of the securities and the accountant does not have the issuer/security
nexus present in the category 2 cases. Nonetheless, the accountant
cases just cited146 do not even impose the intent requirement many
category 2 cases impose. Thus, an odd situation arises in which the
connection appears more attenuated, but the stringency of the "in
connection with" inquiry is actually lessened.
Another panel of the same court solved the anomaly in 1975 by
adopting the more stringent category 2 principle for application of
the "in connection with" requirement: the necessity of finding both
causation/materiality and intent by the defendant. 47 In Competitive
144. 785 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
145. Id at 40-41 (where accountant fraudulently misrepresented the financial con-
dition of "repo" lender, such misrepresentation was in connection with the purchase of
repo contracts since that financial condition is something repo purchasers rely upon).
See also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1978):
[T]he "in connection with" requirement of Rule 10b-5 imposes in these cases
the limitation that defendants can be liable for misrepresentations and omis-
sions only if the defendants reasonably could foresee that these misstatements
would be used in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Id at 887 (footnote omitted) (denying judgment non obstante veredicto for defendant
accounting firm).
146. See supra note 145.
147. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
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Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,148 the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant accounting firm intentionally
misstated a financial advisor's finances in an attempt to induce the
plaintiff to allow the advisor to purchase and sell securities for him-
purchases and sales the plaintiff claimed were manipulative. In af-
firming the denial of summary judgment for the defendant, the panel
first noted that the "touch" test of Bankers Life was a very broad
one.149 It then based its decision that the "in connection with" re-
quirement was satisfied on the fact that the plaintiff had alleged ac-
tual intent on the part of the defendant to induce the plaintiff to rely
on the alleged misrepresentations in making the investment deci-
sion.150 The panel implicitly rejected the notion that the misrepre-
sentation must concern the securities being purchased or sold.
In 1984, a third panel of the same court adopted the principle im-
plicitly rejected by the Competitive Associates panel. In Chemical
Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,151 the defendant accounting firm al-
legedly made a knowingly false audit of the financial statements of
the Frigitemp Corporation. The plaintiff banks alleged that they re-
lied on those financial statements in making substantial loans to
Frigitemp that were secured in part by a pledge of securities of a
Frigitemp subsidiary.152. Since the Second Circuit had already held
pledges of stock to be "sales" within the meaning of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws,'53 the court was faced
squarely with the question whether the alleged misrepresentations
by the accounting firm in its audit were in connection with the
"sales" of the subsidiary's stock. The panel, in an opinion by Judge
Henry Friendly, held they were not.
Judge Friendly first rejected the contention that the touching lan-
guage of Bankers Life was the standard for satisfying the "in connec-
tion with" requirement. Instead, wrote Friendly, the phrase was just
the literary style of Justice Douglas and carried no content.154 In
fact, Judge Friendly went so far as to opine that the Bankers Life de-
cision had pushed the parameters of the "in connection with" re-
quirement rather far, implicitly suggesting that later Supreme Court
148. 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975).
149. Id. at 815.
150. Id.
151. 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
152. Id. at 941.
153. See Mallis v. FDIC, 568 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 928
(1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 381 (1978).
154. Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 943.
case law limiting 10b-5's expansion called the viability of Bankers
Life into question. 155 Most importantly, however, the 1984 panel of
the Second Circuit did what the 1986 and 1975 panels were unwilling
to do in similar cases: the panel held that the "in connection with"
requirement is only satisfied where the misrepresentations pertain to
the securities themselves:
The purpose of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to protect persons who are deceived
in securities transactions-to make sure that buyers of securities get what
they think they are getting and that sellers of securities are not tricked into
parting with something for a price known to the buyer to be inadequate or for
a consideration known to the buyer not to be what it purports to be.
15 6
In the case before it, the panel found that the plaintiff banks re-
ceived precisely what they expected to receive in the pledge: the se-
curities of a company about which the defendant accounting firm had
made no representation.157 In fact, Judge Friendly explicitly rejected
any weak form of causation as a sufficient principle for satisfaction of
the "in connection with" requirement. "But for" causation is not
enough, the panel decided, and "it is not sufficient to allege that a de-
fendant has committed a proscribed act in a transaction of which the
pledge of securities is a part."158 The panel enunciated what may be
termed a principle of incidentality that arises in many cases: The
pledge of stock "was merely an incident in a transaction not other-
wise involving the purchase or sale of securities.' 59
Thus, in looking at the three Second Circuit decisions, an odd m6-
lange of principles is enunciated for application of the "in connection
with" requirement, some directly at odds with others:
Drysdale Securities (1986):
* Causation, in the form of reliance, sufficient.
Competitive Associates (1975):
* Causation, in the form of reasonable foreseeability of the reli-
ance, insufficient unless defendant intended that reliance.
* Touch test of Bankers Life very broad.
Chemical Bank (1984):
* Touch test of Bankers Life substanceless; pushed parameters of
"in connection with" requirement rather far.
* Mere causation in fact insufficient.
* Misrepresentations must pertain to the securities themselves.
* Incidental association of misrepresentation and purchase or sale
of securities in the same transaction insufficient.
Of course, the confusion is not limited to the Second Circuit. The
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 944 n.24.
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case law involving the "in connection with" requirement and non-
trading accountants evidences a generalized disarray with respect to
guiding principles for the application of the requirement. A lack of
causal relationship between the fraud and purchase or sale has been
held in many such cases to defeat a claim that the "in connection
with" requirement was satisfied. 160 In at least one of those cases, the
lack of causation was explained in terms of the principle of temporal
sequencing discussed above:16 1 where the misrepresentation came af-
ter the transaction, the misrepresentation is not in connection with
that transaction.162 Several courts in the accountant context have
agreed with Judge Friendly's limiting principle that just because a
transaction includes both fraud and a purchase or sale of securities
does not mean that the fraud was in connection with that purchase or
sale.163
In In re Financial Corp. of America Shareholder Litigation,164 the
Ninth Circuit came close to adopting the Chemical Bank holding that
the misrepresentation must concern the securities bought or sold by
the plaintiff. The court found no requisite nexus since the account-
ant's statements had nothing to do with the intrinsic value of the se-
curities, the risks involved in them, or any other factor "reasonably
linked" to the plaintiff's loss. 1 65
Another principle that arises more often in other categories also
finds its way into the accountant cases as well. This principle, which
may be termed a principle of exclusive alternatives, states that where
the fraud is in connection with something other than the purchase or
sale of securities, that fraud may not also be in connection with the
securities transaction. In Rich v. Touche Ross & Co. ,166 the plaintiff
was a customer of a brokerage firm that became insolvent, resulting
in losses to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the auditor of the broker-
age firm, alleging that but for the misrepresentations and omissions
of the auditor, the plaintiff would not have purchased securities
through the broker. The court inquired into whether the alleged
160. See, e.g., Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir.
1988); In re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litig., 796 F.2d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.
1986); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
161. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
162. See Roberts, 857 F.2d at 652.
163. See, e.g., In re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litig., 796 F.2d 1126, 1130
(9th Cir. 1986); DMI Furniture, Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co., 644 F. Supp. 1517, 1528
(C.D. Cal. 1986).
164. 796 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1986).
165. Id. at 1130.
166. 415 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
fraud was "so proximately related either to a purchase or a sale, as to
be actionable as 'in connection with' such a transaction."16 7 In find-
ing that the proximate relation was absent, the court applied a princi-
ple of exclusive alternatives: "The alleged misrepresentations and
omissions were not made in connection with any purchase of securi-
ties, but rather, in connection with a bailment."168 The court did not
explain why fraud could not be in connection with both the purchase
and the bailment. This principle of exclusive alternatives is explored
in more detail below.169
3. Misrepresentations by Other Third-Party Non-Traders
This category of cases is not limited to brokers and accountants.
Indeed, the problems are similar whenever a third-party who is not a
trader of securities makes misrepresentations that affect the invest-
ment decision of people who do trade securities. For example, in Cro-
foot v. Sperry Rand Corp.,170 a corporation was formed and sought
computer hardware from the defendant. Before the corporation sold
its stock to the initial subscribers, the defendant allegedly made as-
surances concerning the usefulness of its hardware. When those as-
surances turned out to be false, the investors sued under 10b-5,
claiming the assurances were in connection with their purchase of
the corporation's stock. The court rejected the defendant's motion to
dismiss, finding the "in connection with" requirement satisfied, since
the assurances were allegedly made in a manner calculated to influ-
ence the plaintiffs' investment decision.1 7
A similar analysis was made in Jabend, Inc. v. Four-Phase Systems,
Inc.,172 where on similar facts, the court found the "in connection
with" requirement unsatisfied. The individual plaintiff organized a
computer company and caused the plaintiff corporation to issue him
stock. The plaintiffs alleged that the corporation was formed based
on misrepresentations of the defendant that the defendant could sup-
ply computer equipment capable of making the plaintiff's corpora-
tion feasible. The equipment turned out to be unusable, and the
plaintiffs sued under 10b-5. The court found the "in connection
with" requirement unsatisfied because the plaintiffs failed to show
that the alleged fraud in the sale of the computer equipment was cal-
culated to influence the sale of stock by the corporation. 173 Specifi-
167. Id. at 98.
168. Id. at 99; cf. In re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litig., 796 F.2d 1126,
1130-31 (9th Cir. 1986) (loss that resulted from SEC accounting ruling could not also
have resulted from defendant's fraud).
169. See injfra note 273 and accompanying text.
170. 408 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
171. Id at 1158-59.
172. 631 F. Supp. 1339, 1343-44 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
173. Id. at 1343.
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cally, the court stated:
There is no direct connection between Four-Phase's alleged misrepresenta-
tions and Gr6senick's purchase of Jabend stock. Even assuming that Four-
Phase meant to defraud Jabend in the sale of its computers, Grosenick has not
shown that such fraud was an overall scheme to defraud purchasers of Jabend
stock. . . . Four-Phase had nothing to gain from Jabend's sale of common
stock.1
7 4
The disarray in the cases is evident. The courts use nearly a dozen
principles, in various combinations, in an attempt to justify applica-
tion of the "in connection with" requirement to specific fact patterns.
Many of these principles are passed from category to category with-
out any inquiry as to their applicability as the fact patterns change in
their levels of attenuation between fraud and transaction.
D. Category 4: Corporate Mismanagement Cases
A category of cases in which the focus is less on causation than in
the first three, but which contains many conceptual similarities to
the category 2 and category 3 cases, is that involving application of
10b-5 to instances of corporate mismanagement. This particularly
vexing set of cases exists in a vise between two accepted principles.
The first is that the federal securities laws generally, and 10b-5 spe-
cifically, are not to be used as mechanisms for complaining about or-
dinary corporate mismanagement.175 The second is that 10b-5 is
applicable even if the 10b-5 violation also happens to be a breach of
fiduciary duty by managers. 176
The mismanagement cases have some similarity to the category 2
cases as the complaint is typically leveled by a shareholder at his own
corporation or its management. They are also similar to the broker
cases of category 3 as they involve the breach of an implicit promise
to perform faithfully.177 The case law in this area is also in a state of
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1977); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
176. See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1282 (2d Cir.), reh'g en
banc denied, 533 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 429 U.S. 881 (1976);
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1974); Popkin v.
Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 808 (5th Cir.
1970); Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 1970); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.,
320 F. Supp. 539, 543-44 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp.
21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
177. Courts generally recognize that a mere breach of the implicit representation to
perform one's fiduciary duties faithfully will not give rise to a 10b-5 action. See, e.g.,
Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1986). Indeed that principle is clearly implicit
confusion as a result of the courts' inability to reach a consensus on
the proper principles for interpretation and application of the "in
connection with" requirement. The mismanagement cases are of two
primary types: those involving sales by a corporation of securities for
inadequate consideration, and those involving internal power
struggles.
1. Sales for Inadequate Consideration
Because the Bankers Life178 case involved an allegation that the
corporation was duped into selling securities through a misrepresen-
tation that the corporation would receive the consideration for the
sale, and because that case held that such an allegation stated a claim
under 10b-5, subsequent cases involving similar facts have reached
the same conclusions without much discussion.179 However, Bankers
Life leaves no discernible principle (aside from the "touching" state-
ment of Justice Douglas) for why such a misrepresentation is deemed
to be in connection with the sale of securities. Such principles are de-
veloped more fully in pre-Bankers Life cases.
The year before Bankers Life was decided, the Fifth Circuit held in
Rekant v. Dresser,80 that where officers or directors cause the corpo-
ration to sell stock to them for grossly inadequate consideration, the
corporation has a 10b-5 action against them, even where the same
acts would result in liability under state fiduciary duty principles.181
The rationale offered by the court is curious: such a case is not sig-
nificantly different from one in which one person perpetrates securi-
ties fraud on another. 8 2 One might agree that, by analogy, such a
case should be treated the same as a category 1 case, but the attenua-
tion between the fraud and the transaction is clearly greater. In fact,
one might also analogize such a case to those cases in which one
party simply steals securities from another. The only difference is
that a conversion involves no consideration, whereas Rekant involved
grossly inadequate consideration. Such a conversion of stock is gen-
erally thought to not give rise to a 10b-5 action. 8 3
in the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), in
which the Court held that corporate mismanagement involving full and complete dis-
closure does not give rise to a 10b-5 claim.
178. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
179. See, e.g., Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525 (7th Cir.
1972). See also SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 435 F.2d 510, 517 (2d Cir. 1970)
(pre-Bankers Life case finding, without meaningful discussion, no error in granting an
SEC injunction under 10b-5 where corporate officers sought to sell stock to another
corporation knowing that the latter could not pay for it).
180. 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
181. Id. at 882.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 1986); Bochicchio v. Smith
Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 647 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Bosio v. Norbay
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The point is not that the case was wrongly decided. Indeed, as sug-
gested above, Bankers Life was an unextraordinary case given the
Court's finding that the corporation/seller was duped into believing it
would receive consideration for the securities sold. Rather, the point
is that in Rekant the rationale was insufficiently articulated.
A much more satisfying attempt to explain the "in connection
with" requirement came in Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.,184 in which
the plaintiff alleged on behalf of the corporation that the corporation
had been duped by its directors into selling nearly $2 million worth
of stock to the defendant for approximately $440,000. The court re-
fused to dismiss the case, and in the course of its decision introduced
a principle that segregates those cases in which the securities transac-
tion is merely incidental to the fraud from those in which the trans-
action is an essential feature of the scheme. "[T]here must be a
determination," wrote the court, "of the degree to which the securi-
ties transactions were incidental to the fraud."'18 5
In doing so, the court distinguished those cases in which the securi-
ties transaction came after the fact as an incidental means, for exam-
ple, of obscuring the fraud that had already occurred:
In the instant case, however else the parties may have accomplished their
goals, they chose in fact to trade securities. The form of the transaction neces-
sarily brought into being a buyer and a seller of securities. A transfer of se-
curities ensued. This securities transaction was not merely incidental to the
transaction but was the heart of it. It was not designed in any way to disguise
or obscure the transfer and, finally, it is alleged to be the gist of the purported
conspiracy to deceive and defraud. It was, therefore, a sale of securities of
such a nature as to come within the ambit of the federal securities laws. 18 6
Of course, the court did not explain how to determine whether the
securities transaction was incidental or essential to the fraud, but at
least the court articulated a principle for application of the "in con-
nection with" requirement. This incidental/essential distinction is
one that recurs in the case law.'8 7
2. Intracorporate Power Struggles
Indeed, the distinction drawn by the court in Bailey between inci-
dental and essential transactions was used, along with two other prin-
Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1564-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); cf. T. HAZEN, supra note 22,
§ 13.6, at 120 (1985 & Supp. 1988). "Thus, a conversion of securities will not support a
lOb-5 claim without a showing that it was fraudulently induced." Id.
184. 320 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
185. Id. at 543.
186. Id. at 543-44.
187. See iqfra note 305 and accompanying text.
ciples for application of the "in connection with" requirement, by the
Fourth Circuit in Taylor v. First Union Corp. of South Carolina.88
The plaintiff's husband had been a director of a bank holding com-
pany (the Southern Company), in which the plaintiff held stock. The
plaintiff sold her stock to the defendant, First Union, at $18 per share
shortly before First Union merged with the Southern Company at
$33 per share. Not long after that, plaintiff's husband was pressured
into resigning, and he alleged that he was lied to in the course of the
termination. In the action, the plaintiff sought relief under 10b-5, ar-
guing that the lies made to her husband were in connection with the
sale of stock shortly before the merger.'8 9
In reversing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the court ruled
that the alleged lies were not in connection with the sale of stock for
three reasons. First, the court reiterated the incidental/essential dis-
tinction made in Bailey. It found the misrepresentations to have con-
cerned his employment, not the sale of the stock. The plaintiff had
argued that the stock sale was all part of a larger fraudulent scheme,
but the court disagreed: "The alleged acts of deception here most di-
rectly involve circumstances of that termination and are only tangen-
tially and incidentally related to the sale of plaintiff's stock."' 9 0
Second, the court stated the principle of exclusive alternatives:
"[A]ny misrepresentations concerning the purpose of the meeting at
which Taylor was terminated were plainly not in connection with the
stock sale, but rather, were in connection with the discharge." 9 1 The
court made it clear that the policies of the securities laws are not fur-
thered by applying 10b-5 whenever there is wrongdoing and a sale of
stock happens to take place.192
Finally, the court seemed to suggest that any misrepresentation
would have to relate to the merits of the security being sold, echoing
the holding of Judge Friendly in the Chemical Bank case:193 "The
plaintiff was not misled in her investment decision by the non-disclo-
sure of material information nor was she deceived about the value of
the stock or the potential value of the company. Thus, the requisite
nexus between the sale and any fraud or deception is simply
lacking."194
The approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Taylor-presenting
numerous possible rationales for a given application of the "in con-
nection with" requirement-is as typical in category 4 cases as it is in
188. 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988).
189. Id. at 242.
190. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 247.
193. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
194. Taylor, 857 F.2d at 246.
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other categories. The incidental/essential distinction, for example,
finds its way into many of these cases, 19 5 often combined with other
principles, such as causation196 or temporal sequencing. 197 Even the
principle of exclusive alternatives has found expression in this type
of case.198 Other courts have been much less forthcoming in explain-
ing why an intracorporate power struggle with a securities transac-
tion does or does not involve fraud in connection with such a
transaction. Often, courts dismiss a case involving an intracorporate
power struggle by reciting the maxim that not every breach of fiduci-
ary duty is a 10b-5 violation, and 10b-5 should not be used to remedy
mere breaches of such a duty.199
Without doubt, however, the most doctrinally rich opinion concern-
ing the "in connection with" requirement in the power struggle con-
text came from the Third Circuit in Ketchum v. Green.20 0 In that
seminal case, the plaintiffs were officers and directors of a corpora-
tion who controlled a majority of the stock of that corporation.
There was an agreement in effect that stipulated that any officer
whose employment was terminated was required to sell his stock
back to the corporation for a calculated sum. The defendants, other
directors, allegedly planned a scheme whereby the board would ap-
prove a slate of directors, a majority of whom were hostile to the
plaintiffs and whose hostility was concealed from the plaintiffs. As
soon as the new board was elected (plaintiffs naively voting their ma-
jority of shares in favor of the slate), the board voted to terminate
195. See, e.g., Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1282 (2d Cir.) (allegation
of freeze-out without business purpose states claim under 10b-5, where "a purchase
and sale of securities is at the heart of the fraudulent scheme"), reh'g en banc denied,
533 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir.), vacated, 429 U.S. 881 (1976).
196. See, e.g., Hunt v. Robinson, 852 F.2d 786, 786-88 (4th Cir. 1988) (allegation that
defendants agreed as part of employment contract with plaintiff to give him stock and
then reneged was insufficient under 10b-5 even if contract is deemed a "sale," since the
gravamen of the complaint was failure to convey stock and since there was no causal
link between the misrepresentation and the sale).
197. See, e.g., Lester v. Preco Indus., 282 F. Supp. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (allega-
tion that defendants sold stock to public and then mismanaged company, causing de-
cline in share value, did not state claim under 10b-5, since sale of stock was incidental
to any wrongdoing and any misrepresentations occurred after sales).
198. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 435 (10th Cir. 1973) (where injury
results from corporate mismanagement rather than from purchase or sale of securities,
any fraud is not in connection with that purchase or sale).
199. See, e.g., Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also
Buffo v. Graddick, 742 F.2d 592, 596 (11th Cir. 1984) (one factor to consider in applying
"in connection with" requirement is whether the transaction involved little more than
corporate mismanagement).
200. 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 940 (1977).
the plaintiffs and to force them to sell their stock back to the corpo-
ration. The plaintiffs sued under 10b-5 claiming the deception con-
cerning the mechanism of ouster was in connection with the forced
sale of their securities. 201 The Third Circuit accepted the claim that
there was deception involved;202 there was no doubt that the plain-
tiffs were being forced to sell securities. Nonetheless, the court
found that the deception was not in connection with that sale,203 and
in the course of the opinion the court touched on no fewer than six
principles for application of the "in connection with" requirement.
First, the court discussed the degree to which the stock sale was
merely incidental to the deception. After noting that cases following
Bankers Life had tended to require only a tangential relationship be-
tween the fraud and the transaction, the court noted that in the case
before it the "thrust" of the complaint was not the stock sale but the
plaintiffs' ouster.204 Thus, the stock sale was a mere "consequence"
of the deception.2 05
Second, the court made a statement of the exclusive alternatives
principle. It reasoned that the fraud occurred not in connection with
the stock sale: "To the contrary, the purportedly deceptive practices
occurred . . . in connection with the struggle for control of the
corporation."206
Third, the court discussed the "in connection with" requirement in
terms of transactional proximity:
The Supreme Court's opinion in Bankers Life does not reveal how close a
nexus must exist between a misrepresentation and a transaction. Nonethe-
less, it is quite evident that there was a fairly tight linkage between these ele-
ments in the Bankers Life setting: the theft of the consideration flowing from
the sale of the bonds was only one step removed from the bond transaction
itself.
2 0 7
In the case before it, the court found many intervening steps between
the fraud and the sale of the stock, leading to its conclusion that the
fraud and the sale were not tied together sufficiently.2 08  In the
court's view, then, there must be a "tight linkage" between the de-
ception and the transaction; the degree of linkage is determined at
least in part, by examining the directness with which the transaction
follows the deception.
Fourth, the Third Circuit argued that the directness of linkage is
not exactly a matter of causation. Both causation and the "in connec-
tion with" requirement have to do with proximity, and they are con-
201. 557 F.2d at 1023-24.
202. Id. at 1026.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1026-27.
205. Id. at 1028.
206. Id. at 1027-28.
207. Id. at 1028.
208. Id.
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ceptually intertwined, but the "in connection with" requirement
requires a slightly different analysis.20 9 In downplaying the role of
causation, the court seemed to be at odds with another Third Circuit
case of the same year in which an intracorporate power struggle was
held not to implicate 10b-5. In that case, Tully v. Mott Supermarkets,
Inc.,210 the panel found the "in connection with" requirement unsat-
isfied, in part because there was a lack of causal connection between
the fraud and the securities transaction.2 1' That two panels of the
same court can be at odds with one another on such a matter in the
same year is perhaps an illustration of the difficulty and confusion
surrounding the "in connection with" requirement.21 2
The fifth principle discussed by the court in Ketchum is related
closely to the incidental/essential distinction. The court noted that
the purpose of the deception was not to cause a stock sale; rather, the
purpose was to oust the plaintiffs from their position of control. 213
The securities transaction was a mere consequence.21 4 This is what
differentiates later cases which were decided on facts seemingly simi-
lar to Ketchum. In both McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp.215 and
Brown v. Ivie,21 6 the courts distinguished Ketchum by noting that in
Ketchum the purpose of the scheme had been ouster; the securities
transaction was merely incidental. In the cases before them, the Mc-
Grath and Brown courts noted that the purpose of the schemes was
to obtain securities at discount; the ouster was simply the mechanism
used.2 17
Finally, the court pointed out that there should be an automatic
bias against using 10b-5 to resolve intracorporate disputes. That is,
courts should be hesitant to expand the federal securities laws into
the corporate arena.218
Ketchum may be criticized on many grounds. For example, it is
not clear that the stock sale was merely an incidental consequence of
the scheme. Since the plaintiffs were majority shareholders, they
209. Id. at 1029.
210. 540 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977).
211. Id. at 194.
212. The phenomenon is not as unusual as one might think, however. See Solimine,
Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C.L. REV. 36, 39-40 n.36 (1988).
213. Ketchum, 557 F.2d at 1028.
214. Id.
215. 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
216. 661 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
217. McGrath, 651 F.2d at 467; Brown, 661 F.2d at 65.
218. Ketchum, 577 F.2d at 1029.
could not be ousted unless their stock were taken. Also, the principle
of exclusive alternatives is of questionable assistance in applying the
"in connection with" requirement.2 19 Nonetheless, the opinion is val-
uable for the variety of principles discussed, and as an illustration of
the conceptual struggle involved in trying to apply this rather slip-
pery 10b-5 requirement.
Also important to note is the degree of cross-fertilization between
the different categories of "in connection with" cases. Many of the
principles discussed by the court in Ketchum appear in other catego-
ries of cases as well, yet none of the courts' opinions question the pro-
priety of using a given set of principles for obviously different fact
patterns.
E. Category 5: Misappropriation Cases
Without a doubt the most topical category of cases involving the
"in connection with" requirement is that involving insider trading
following the misappropriation of information. In a classic instance
of insider trading, a corporate insider-for example, an officer or di-
rector of the firm-uses material non-public information to trade
with his own shareholders. Courts have long recognized such a case
as an instance of deception (silence in the face of a fiduciary duty to
speak),220 and without question such deception is in connection with
the purchase of the securities from the shareholder.221 In a misap-
propriation case, however, the facts are different: an insider in Firm
A commits a deception on Firm A by "misappropriating" through
stealth valuable non-public information, which the insider uses to
trade with the shareholders of Firm B. The important question for
our purposes in such cases is not whether there was a deception-
stealth is necessary to the misappropriation; 222 rather, the important
question is whether that deception on Firm A can be said to be "in
connection with" the trading with Firm B's shareholders.
The Second Circuit has faced this question squarely in three well-
219. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text; infra note 273 and accompany-
ing text.
220. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969):
221. Such a case is indistinguishable from category 1 cases once the element of de-
ception is posited.
222. An interesting question, of course, arises as to whether this sort of implicit de-
ception through breach of duty (as opposed to an explicit information-based deception)
is sufficient in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977), that a breach of a corporate manager's implicit representation that he
will act in conformity with fiduciary duty principles is not the sort of deception that
10b-5 reaches. Id. at 477. The Supreme Court seemed to suggest in that case that the
deception must be informationally based, rather than a mere breach of the implicit
representation that one will comply with fiduciary duties. See Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d
455, 458 (2d Cir. 1986). Such a question is beyond the scope of this article.
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publicized and controversial cases. In each one,223 the Second Circuit
has answered the question in the affirmative: if one commits decep-
tion by misappropriating material non-public information from Firm
A and uses that information to trade with Firm B's shareholder, one
commits a deception that is in connection with that trading activity.
In the first of the three Second Circuit misappropriation cases,
United States v. Newman,22 4 the court dealt with the "in connection
with" requirement only summarily. The defendant's sole purpose in
committing the deceptive misappropriation was to purchase securi-
ties. Thus, the court found "little merit in his disavowal of a connec-
tion between the fraud and the purchase." 225 The "purpose"
rationale appears in other categories as well,226 but in the misappro-
priation cases it becomes a focal point.
Thus, in the second case of the trilogy, SEC v. Materia,227 the court
found the "in connection with" requirement satisfied because the de-
ception was part of a scheme whose purpose was to facilitate profita-
ble trading in securities.228 It was not until the third Second Circuit
case was decided that the court began to expand its rationale for find-
ing the "in connection with" requirement satisfied.
Perhaps because of the controversy that arose concerning the Sec-
ond Circuit's use of 10b-5 in misappropriation cases, 229 in United
States v. Carpenter230 the court offered a more in-depth explanation
for its view that in such cases the deception is in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. The court again emphasized the "pur-
pose" rationale by pointing out that the deception was of no value to
the defendant except to the extent it allowed him to trade securities
profitably.231 The court went on, however, to suggest that the "in
connection with" standard is a broad one, citing Bankers Life and
223. The individual fact patterns of the three cases are substantially identical in
structure for purpose of analysis under the "in connection with" requirement.
224. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1982).
225. Id. at 18.
226. See infra notes 284-93 and accompanying text.
227. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073 (1985).
228. Id. at 203.
229. See, e.g., Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-
"Ohiarella"Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 47 (1982); Wang, Recent Developments in
the Federal Law Regulating Stock Market Inside Trading, 6 CORP. L. REV. 291, 302
(1983) (questioning the satisfaction of the "in connection with" requirement in misap-
propriation cases).
230. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 316
(1987).
231. Id. at 1033.
Competitive Associates.232 Interestingly, the court failed to take note
at all of the many cases, 2 3 3 including recent ones from its own cir-
cuit,234 suggesting that the "in connection with" requirement is more
strict than some would suggest.
The Carpenter court also made a rather feeble attempt to use the
causation rationale that is so central to category 1 and category 2
cases. 235 It reasoned that the parties with whom the defendant
traded would not have sold stock to the defendant had they known of
the deceptively acquired information.23 6 That undoubtedly is true,
but it is not helpful. For the deceptive conduct to be even a "but for"
cause of the "victims'" trades, it must be asserted that those who
were selling at the same time the defendant was buying would not
have sold if the defendant had not engaged in the deceptive misap-
propriation. In an anonymous auction market, that statement of cau-
sation simply cannot be made. Arguably, "but for" the
misappropriation, the securities trades by the defendant would not
take place, therefore causation exists. But this sort of causation is an
extremely weak form. A misappropriation of information causes a
securities trade only in the same sense that long weeks of prepara-
tion "cause" a mountain climber to scale Mount Everest. Causation,
to have any real meaning, must be of a stronger type. Thus the cau-
sation rationale, stated by some courts as the touchstone of the "in
connection with" requirement,237 fails in the category 5 cases.
If the "in connection with" requirement necessitates causation,
that requirement is unsatisfied in the misappropriation cases. This
lack of causation does not mandate the conclusion that the misappro-
priation cases of the Second Circuit have been wrongly decided;
rather, it would be a mistake to require the causation principles to
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Head v. Head, 759 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1985) (rule 10b-5 elements not
met merely by "linking the 'sale' in the escrow transaction to alleged fraud in the prior
property settlement"); Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
940 (1977).
234. See, e.g., Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984). In that case, Judge Friendly, writing for the court, im-
pliedly approved of the circuit's holding that trading on the basis of misappropriated
information violated 10b-5. See id. at 944 n.24.
235. See supra notes 85-93, 102-17 and accompanying text.
236. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1032.
237. See, e.g., Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir.)
(court construed "touching requirement as mandating that there be some causal con-
nection between the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of a security"), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 267 (1985); SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 450 F. Supp. 908, 912-13 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(court stated that if "misrepresentations to the corporations and to the public in fact
occurred and involved conduct which was virtually indistinguishably linked in a causal
chain, we would certainly find that the fraud 'touched' the purchase or sale of securi-
ties"); Crummere v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 624 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
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support the "in connection with" requirement in both the misappro-
priation cases and other categories as well. Properly understood, the
"in connection with" requirement necessitates the use of different
principles in widely disparate fact situations.
Perhaps the most challenging rationale offered by the Carpenter
court for its finding that the "in connection with" requirement was
satisfied was its assertion that interpreting the requirement in that
way fulfilled the purposes and policies of section 10(b), rule 10b-5,
and the securities laws generally.238 Citing legislative material al-
most exclusively from recent years,239 the court emphasized the
nearly universal desire to ensure the fairness of the markets to all
participants and to create a level playing field for all investors.2 40
Commentators are split on the soundness of the Second Circuit's 24 '
conclusion that the deceptive misappropriation of information is in
connection with the trading on such information.24 2 Professor Bar-
bara Aldave has championed the misappropriation cases for the two
primary rationales supporting the Carpenter decision: the purpose of
the deception and the policies implicated.243 These rationales are
taken up in more detail below.244 However, when comparing the
misappropriation cases with other categories of cases, an interesting
development is seen: The courts are shifting their emphasis away
from certain principles for application of the "in connection with" re-
quirement toward others. Perhaps they recognize the limited use of
principles from other categories in deciding misappropriation cases.
238. Id. at 1029-33.
239. As discussed infra notes 250-52 and accompanying text, the legislative history
for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is scant and indicates clearly that neither Congress nor
the SEC contemplated using the section or the rule to combat insider trading at all,
much less misappropriation cases.
240. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1029-32.
241. The misappropriation theory seems to be catching on in other jurisdictions as
well. In SEC v. Clark, No. C87-711Z (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Courts file), a judge in the Western District of Washington adopted the theory
explicitly and pointed out that in Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1895 (1987), the Third Circuit seemed to accept the theory im-
plicitly. Neither opinion discussed the "in connection with" requirement.
242. Compare, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 229, at 46-47; Cuevas, The Misappropria-
tion Theory and Rule 10b-5: Deadlock in the Supreme Court, 13 J. CORP. L. 793, 813-14
(1988) (criticizing the theory for ignoring a lack of "nexus between the misappropriat-
ing of information and the purchase or sale of securities"); and Wang, supra note 229,
at 302 (questioning the satisfaction of the "in connection with" requirement in misap-
propriation cases); with Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and its Af-
termath, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 373, 377-80 (1988).
243. See Aldave, supra note 242, at 377-80.
244. See irfra notes 284-92, 320-26 and accompanying text.
Alternatively, they may be recognizing that the use of certain princi-
ples from other categories would lead to an undesired result. For ex-
ample, as already noted, requiring causation would lead to the
conclusion that the misappropriation was not in connection with the
purchase or sale. Similarly, a requirement that the deception con-
cern specific securities would lead to an opposite result than the one
reached by the Second Circuit in these cases. Perhaps for that reason
these other principles are simply ignored.
F Category 6: The Conversion of Securities
In category 6, we return nearly to the level of consensus that was
present in category 1. Whereas in category 1 courts uniformly find
the "in connection with" requirement satisfied, in category 6 near
uniformity of opinion can be found at the other end of the spectrum:
courts generally hold that a mere conversion of stock-almost always
a deceptive act-is not deception in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities.2 4 5
What makes this category of cases interesting is not simply that
they arguably lie on the other end of the spectrum from category 1
cases. Rather, the conversion cases are interesting because the courts
do not seem to see the structural parallels between the conversion of
securities followed by a sale of those securities and the misappropria-
tion of material non-public information followed by the purchase of
securities.
One can imagine a scenario in which an investor has securities con-
verted from him by a defendant. That conversion is of the same type
of inherently deceptive act found adequate in the misappropriation
cases. Unless the defendant intends to hold the securities indefi-
nitely for investment purposes, he will sell them.2 46 If the defendant
245. See, e.g., Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 1986); Bochicchio v. Smith
Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 647 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Bosio v. Norbay
Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1564-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); qf T. HAZEN, supra note 22,
§ 13.6, at 120 (1985 & Supp. 1988) ("Thus, a conversion of securities will not support a
10b-5 claim without a showing that it was fraudulently induced."). But see Cooper v.
North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (allegation that banks
loaned plaintiff money to buy securities with the fraudulent intent later to convert
those securities stated claim under 10b-5). These cases are analogous to those in which
the plaintiff alleges that he was induced through fraud to retain securities, then sold
them later at a loss. Courts are split on the question whether the alleged fraud is in
connection with the later sale. Compare, e.g., Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (the "mere retention of securities
and a deferred sale do not satisfy the 'in connection with' nexus") with Feldberg v.
O'Connell, 338 F. Supp. 744, 746-47 (D. Mass. 1972) (contra). See also Stockwell v.
Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). "A seller is injured as much
when he suffers a loss on the sale of securities which he has been fraudulently induced
to retain as when he is fraudulently induced to sell them." Id.
246. If there never is a sale of the converted securities, the case clearly does not
implicate lOb-5--the rule clearly requires that there be a purchase or sale at some
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converted the securities with the intent ultimately to sell them,
thereby realizing the desired profit from the transaction, the struc-
ture of the case is almost indistinguishable from the misappropriation
cases. One can point out that the sole purpose for the defendant's de-
ceptive conversion was to profit by selling the securities. The decep-
tion seems structurally as much in connection with the securities
transaction as that involved in the misappropriation cases. Yet the
outcome of the cases is markedly different.
The most probable explanation for the divergent results in these
two structurally similar fact patterns is that the structure of the mis-
appropriation cases is not sufficient to justify the result. The mere
fact that the purpose of the deception was to permit a later securities
transaction is simply not what makes the misappropriation cases
seem appropriate for application of 10b-5. Rather, what undoubtedly
has compelled the Second Circuit's development of the misappropria-
tion theory from the start has been its view of the impact that such a
transaction has on securities markets and securities buyers and sell-
ers. In other words, the more detailed rationale offered by the Car-
penter court-that the misappropriation cases satisfy the "in
connection with" requirement because to so hold better serves the
policies of the federal securities laws-is what really lies alone be-
hind the theory. There is no other way to reconcile the misappropri-
ation cases with the conversion cases. 247 The sufficiency of that
policy rationale as a justification for interpreting the "in connection
with" requirement in a given way is the linchpin for the misappropri-
ation theory.
V. MATCHING PRINCIPLES AND CATEGORIES
In part IV, three facts became apparent. First, courts use a large
number of principles or rationales in deciphering the "in connection
with" requirement. Second, the types of cases in which courts are
forced to apply the requirement are disparate, mirroring the explo-
sive use of 10b-5 to cover a wide range of fact patterns. Third, courts
point in the transaction. From the victim's point of view, of course, what the defend-
ant ultimately does with the securities is of no concern. Therefore, if 10b-5 is used
when there is a conversion followed by a sale, but not when there is a simple conver-
sion, the difference in outcomes turns on a fortuity (from the victim's point of view)
necessitated by the statutory language.
247. Indeed, much of the conversion case law comes from the Second Circuit. See,
e.g., Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 1986); Bochicchio v. Smith Barney, Harris,
Upham & Co., 647 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Bosio v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 599
F. Supp. 1563, 1564-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
are in a state of confusion concerning the proper principles to use in
given fact patterns and seem to be unaware of the dissimilarities be-
tween the various types of cases in which the "in connection with"
requirement arises. At the same time, their confusion is manifested
in their failure to explain why they seem willing to use certain prin-
ciples cross-categorically sometimes and yet eschew principles from
other categories in other cases. One senses a complete unawareness
of the problem.
The purpose of part V is to attempt to sort out those principles and
categories with the ultimate aim of formulating a list of appropriate
"in connection with" inquiries for each of the six categories of cases
described in part IV. Section A sets the groundwork by examining
each of the many principles used by courts. Most of the principles
have been at least mentioned in part IV, but some have not. In sec-
tion A the principles are sorted through in an attempt to determine
which are viable at all and, of those that are viable, the types of cases
in which they are viable. Section B then summarizes the section A
analysis by going through the categories one by one and pointing out
the inquiries appropriate for a court to make in determining whether
the "in connection with" requirement is satisfied.
A. Examining the Principles
The principles that may be useful in the interpretation of the "in
connection with" requirement can be broken down into two types:
general principles of limitation and specific principles of application.
General principles of limitation are those useful, not as tests or
touchstones for the "in connection with" requirement, but as general
statements concerning the parameters of possible outcomes. They
might suggest, for example, that the requirement is a broad one that
imposes little limitation on the types of cases that may arise under
10b-5. Alternatively, they might suggest that there are limits that
the "in connection with" requirement places on 10b-5. General prin-
ciples of limitation set the boundaries for our discussion; they help
describe the spectrum of cases that may be deemed to satisfy the "in
connection with" requirement.
Specific principles of application offer more guidance. Courts at-
tempt to use them as touchstones at times. Further, they posit the
proper questions to be asked when faced with the task of deciding
whether a particular act of deception was in connection with this par-
ticular sale of stock.
There is a certain artificiality to the distinction between the two
types of principles, but the distinction is helpful in understanding the
use to which given principles may properly be put. Courts err when
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they conclude simply from general principles of limitation that the
"in connection with" requirement is either satisfied or not satisfied.
1. General Principles of Limitation
Courts interpreting the "in connection with" requirement are fond
of broad statements of legal principles that purport to offer guidance
in application of the requirement. In this section, four such princi-
ples used by courts in the past are examined first. An examination of
those broad principles shows them to be varied in their helpfulness.
Then, three new principles of limitation are presented that should
guide courts in their selection of more specific principles of
application.
a. Limitation Principle 1: Rule 10b-5 should be interpreted
flexibly, not restrictively, to protect and effectuate its
broad remedial purposes.
This popular generality, which originated in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc.248 more than twenty-five years ago is almost
worthless. First, it originated in the halcyon days of unlimited ex-
pansion of 10b-5. More recent Supreme Court cases have properly
noted that there are limits to the "flexibility" of 10b-5; the rule is to
be read more "restrictively" in important ways than had been the
case in the past.2 4 9 Maxims of an earlier time in which the climate
for 10b-5 cases was different are thus of limited guidance today.
Second, 10b-5 has no "broad remedial purposes" as a matter of his-
tory. It was drafted and adopted in a single day to deal with a com-
pany president in Boston who was buying the shares of his company
through using misrepresentations. Rule 10b-5's only purpose was to
close a loophole in the antifraud provisions whereby under section
17(a) of the 1933 Act, fraud in the sale of securities was a crime, but
fraud in the purchase of securities was not.250 Further, any state-
ments concerning section 10(b)'s broad purposes are wholly without
support, since there is almost no legislative history for the section.251
248. 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
249. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (rule 1Ob-5 lim-
ited by section 10(b), which requires deception or manipulation); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (rule 10b-5 requires showing of scienter); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-33 (1975) (plaintiff must be actual pur-
chaser or seller of securities).
250. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW.
793, 922 (1967) (statement of Mr. Milton Freedman).
251. Accord Comment, Securities Law-Rule lOb-5-For Fraud to be "In Connec-
The only meaningful statement during hearings on the 1934 Act was
made by Thomas Corcoran, who skipped over section 10(b) by noting
it was a general catchall for manipulative devices, not mentioning at
all the "deceptive" language in the section,252 which is the basis for
all the interesting "in connection with" cases.25 3 Thus, there is no
justification for using this principle to rationalize a loose "in connec-
tion with" requirement.254
b. Limitation Principle 2: The "in connection with"
requirement should be interpreted loosely because
Bankers Life stated that the fraud need only
"touch" the securities transaction.
Drawing from the touching language of Bankers Life, the proposi-
tion that the "in connection with" requirement should be interpreted
loosely is a mistake for reasons discussed above:2 5 there is nothing
in the notion of "touching" that implies necessarily either a loose or a
tight nexus requirement; the phrase from Justice Douglas' opinion in
which that concept is drawn was merely that justice's literary style
restating the requirement; that case was decided in a different 10b-5
era predating a more restrictive approach by the Supreme Court.
Those points are made above and need not be repeated at length
here. The Bankers Life phraseology offers no guidance.
tion With" A Purchase or Sale of Securities Under Section 10(b), Plaintiffs Must Al-
lege a Causal Connection and Close Degree of Proximity Between the Purchase or Sale
of Securities and Defendants' Fraudulent Scheme-Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 431 (1977), 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 484 n.17 (1978);
Note, Securities Regulation-Rule lOb-5-The Supreme Court's Holding in Superin-
tendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 US. 6 (1971), May Force a
Renewed Search for a Limiting Doctrine for Rule 10b-5 Liability, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1273,
1273 n.3 (1972).
252. Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on HR 7852 and HR 8720 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (re-
marks of Mr. Thomas Corcoran). Section 10(b)'s scant legislative record is traced in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-07 (1976).
253. Manipulation is a term of art that describes practices such as matched buy-sell
orders, false touts, and attempts to corner a market. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 476 (1977). Because manipulation of securities prices will always be in con-
nection with the purchase and/or sale of those securities, the only controversies con-
cerning the "in connection with" requirement will come in deception cases.
254. See DMI Furniture, Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co., 644 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (C.D.
Cal. 1986) (to say that courts should interpret the "in connection with" clause broadly
to protect investors offers no guidance).
255. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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c. Limitation Principle 3: The "in connection with" language of
rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) should be interpreted broadly, since
by using the language "in connection with," Congress indicated
its intent that a looser standard apply in section 10(b) cases than
in 1933 Act section 17(a) cases, where the requirement is that the
fraud be "in the sale of securities."
In an attempt to extract some guidance from the statutory frame-
work, some courts have noted the difference in language used in sec-
tion 17(a) of the 1933 Act256 and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.257
Section 17(a) proscribes fraud "in the sale of securities," whereas sec-
tion 10(b) proscribes fraud "in connection with" the purchase or sale
of securities. Some courts have drawn the implication that Congress
must have intended that section 10(b)'s required nexus be of a looser
type than that required for section 17(a) cases. 25 8 Other courts have
rejected such a suggestion, 25 9 and a few, including the Supreme
Court, have exhibited non-committal skepticism on the question. 260
Despite the difference in language used in the two sections, there is
nothing in the legislative history of section 10(b) to indicate that Con-
gress was even aware of the difference. As Judge Friendly once
pointed out in rejecting the argument that "in connection with" is
necessarily broader than "in," "courts sometimes err in attributing
substantive importance to what may well have been only a drafts-
man's choice of slightly different language."261 In the Bankers Life
decision, Justice Douglas even made the statement that what section
256. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982).
257. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
258. See, e.g., SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 450 F. Supp. 908, 916 (E.D. Pa. 1978). "Plain-
tiff will have to demonstrate at trial a more direct involvement in the offer or sale of
securities to make out a § 17(a) violation than is necessary to establish a violation of
§ 10(b) or Rule 10b-5." Id. Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715,
718 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (words of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 "have been construed more
liberally in order to carry out the intent of the act").
259. Somogyi v. Butler, 518 F. Supp. 970, 983 n.13 (D.N.J. 1981) ("in connection
with" requirement and definition of "security transaction" apply with equal force to
section 17(a)).
260. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 n.4 (1979) (stating that the
Court is "not necessarily persuaded" that "in" is narrower than "in connection with");
Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 884 (1984); SEC v. Warner, 652 F. Supp. 647, 651 (S.D. Fla. 1987). "It is unclear
whether the § 17(a) requirement that the fraud be 'in' the offer or sale connotes a nar-
rower range of activities than does the 'in connection with' requirement of § 10(b)."
Id.
261. Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 942.
10(b) prohibits is fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.26 2
Although it would be comforting to find a tidy statutory solution to
the "in connection with" problem, to draw any instrumental conclu-
sions from the difference in language is to read too much into the
statutes.
d. Limitation Principle 4: Not just any wrongdoing that happens
to occur in the same fact setting with a purchase or
sale of securities occurs "in connection with"
that purchase or sale.
This general proposition is stated often by both courts263 and com-
mentators. 264 The proposition is true, but it offers almost no substan-
tive guidance. It is obviously true, because if it were false, the "in
connection with" requirement would impose no limitation at all.
Even the scenario A set forth in part I above265 (in which a shoe
salesman commits fraud in shoe sales and simultaneously sells securi-
ties honestly) would implicate 10b-5.
But this general proposition is simply another way of saying that
the "in connection with" requirement has limits. It does not indicate
what those limits are. In practice, the proposition is used as a warn-
ing about overreaching arguments or as a foreshadowing by courts.
Typically, the proposition is stated, then more detailed rationales are
given for why the court is ruling the "in connection with" require-
ment unsatisfied.266 For less general limits, principles of application
are necessary.
In addition to these four principles of limitation-of which only the
fourth is viable-three other possibilities exist.
262. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971).
263. See, e.g., Hunt v. Robinson, 852 F.2d 786, 787 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Fraudulent non-
conveyance ... not transformed into a federal claim simply because the object of the
bargain was shares of stock"); In re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litig., 796 F.2d
1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 1986) (insufficient to allege that fraud and the purchase or sale of
securities occurred in same transaction); Head v. Head, 759 F.2d 1172, 1175 (4th Cir.
1985); DMI Furniture, Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co., 644 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (C.D. Cal.
1986). "[Nlot every person who performs an act which could be deemed to involve a
security is held to have acted 'in connection with' a securities transaction." Id. Smith
v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). "Plaintiff may not convert a
state law claim into a Rule 10b-5 claim simply by alleging that it was a defrauded party
and that at some time a purchase or sale of a security was made." Id.
264. See, e.g., T. HAZEN, supra note 22, § 13.6, at 120 (1985 & Supp. 1988) ("The 'in
connection with' requirement will not support a 10b-5 action for any wrongdoing that
happens to involve a security."); Note, supra note 251, at 1280.
265. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
266. See cases cited supra note 263.
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e. Limitation Principle 5: In each category of "in connection
with" cases, there must be recognized some principle of
application that imposes some limits on our
ability to claim that the deception is in
connection with the securities transactions.
Because the "in connection with" requirement must have some
limits, it follows that for any given category of cases, we must be pre-
pared to recognize at least one principle that acts as a limit in that
particular category. A given category may have such a limit simply
because of the structure of the category-that is, the way in which
the category is described. For example, although all category 1 cases
satisfy the "in connection with" requirement, there are inherent lim-
its in those types of cases: the securities fraud involved always entails
causation, the deception always goes to the merits of the security be-
ing traded, and the defendant is always a trader.26 7 Although limits
may not exist in other categories of cases, they do exist in the cate-
gory 1 cases. Limits must be identified for every category.
f Limitation Principle 6: The defendant's conduct should always
be of a type colloquially characterized as "securities
fraud."
Ultimately, asking "Is this securities fraud?" begs the question.
Yet a form of that question can be helpful. Although the legislative
history for section 10(b) is sketchy at best, common sense indicates
that what Congress was trying to do in enacting that section was to
prohibit what both it and we colloquially refer to as "securities
fraud." Congress was undoubtedly motivated by contemplation of a
set of paradigms of securities fraud-the Platonic form of securities
fraud. Indeed only six years after a private right of action was first
recognized for 10b-5, an august panel of the Second Circuit suggested
that the rule was directed only at those types of deceptions or fraudu-
lent practices normally associated with the sale or purchase of securi-
ties.268 Thus, by asking whether this is what is colloquially referred
to as securities fraud, the real question becomes: "How close does this
267. Cf. Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339, 362-63 (N.D.
Ohio 1976) (allegation of misrepresentation in offering circular of stock seller estab-
lishes sufficient "nexus" for 10b-5).
268. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952). But see A. T, Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1967)
(rejecting notion that 10b-5 is limited to ordinary securities fraud). The panel in Birn-
baum was made up of Judge Swan and the Hand brothers, Learned and Augustus.
come to the paradigmatic situation Congress undoubtedly had in
mind in enacting section 10(b)?" It is in answer to this question that
what is referred to above269 as "the principle of greatest possible con-
nection" arises: where the facts show a case representing the para-
digm, it is difficult to deny the connection. The further away from
the paradigmatic category 1 case, the less the case feels to a court like
"securities fraud." Consequently, a court should be also less willing
to find the "in connection with" requirement satisfied. This requires
an exercise of judgment, but that after all is what judges do.
g. Limitation Principle 7: No person should be found to have
committed fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities unless that person was an
actual purchaser or seller of securities.
A fundamental ambiguity exists in the wording of section 10(b).
When Congress prohibits deception and manipulation in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities, is the "purchase or sale" lan-
guage directed at the perpetrators or the victims? That is, did Con-
gress mean to prohibit deception and manipulation in connection
with the investing public's (i.e., the victim's) purchases and sales, or
did Congress mean to prohibit deception and manipulation in connec-
tion with the perpetrator's purchases or sales? The better interpre-
tation is the latter.
First, it better comports with the structure of the statute. The stat-
ute reads in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful for any person.., to
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity.... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of [SEC rules]." 270 In referring to manipulative or deceptive
devices, Congress clearly is referring to acts of the perpetrator. By
interpreting the "purchase or sale" language also to refer to acts of
the perpetrator, the consistency of the internal sentence structure is
preserved. Thus, the language used is just an alternative way of say-
ing: "It shall be unlawful for any person to use or employ, in connec-
tion with his purchase or sale of any security, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance." If Congress did not intend a paral-
lel construction, one would expect a clear modification of that struc-
ture. For example: "It shall be unlawful for any person to use or
employ in connection with any other person's sale of security, any
manipulative device or contrivance." Either interpretation is possi-
ble; the question is which is more probable.
Two additional points should be made clear about what I suggest is
the proper interpretation. First, my interpretation is clearly inconsis-
269. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
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tent with the great weight of the case law, which has consistently
held that one may be liable under 10b-5 even if one is not a purchaser
or seller.271 Second, this interpretation does not necessarily foreclose
10b-5 liability for those non-traders who may be liable on an aiding
and abetting theory or on an expanded definition of "purchaser" or
"seller" beyond the actual transferor or transferee of title. These
doctrines have a well-developed jurisprudence of their own,27 2 and
the liability of such non-traders should be determined under that ju-
risprudence rather than through a misinterpretation of section 10(b).
2. Specific Principles of Application
None of the principles of limitation actually found in judicial opin-
ions is of much use. The worst are simply flawed, and the best-prin-
ciple 4-is of almost no guidance in actual cases. Further, the three
principles of limitation are only designed to be of general guidance.
If courts are to be meaningfully guided by principles in applying the
"in connection with" requirement to the many categories of cases in
which the problem arises, courts must look to more specific princi-
ples of application. The more specific principles that have been used
are numerous.
a. Application Principle 1: The principle of exclusive
alternatives.
One of the oddest principles used by courts in rejecting "in connec-
tion with" claims is the principle that suggests that fraud cannot be
271. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 759-61 (5th Cir. 1974); Stockwell
v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also T. HAZEN, supra note
22, § 13.6, at 469 (1985). "It is not necessary that the defendant have been a purchaser
or seller of securities in order to be held to have violated rule 10b-5." Id. But cf
Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1975) (the "in connection
with" requirement contemplates some sort of privity between plaintiff and defendant)
(dictum). In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988), the Supreme Court assumed
without deciding that a non-trading issuer could be liable under rule 10b-5 for mislead-
ing statements issued by it. The Court, in dictum quoted with approval the Texas Gulf
Sulfur statement that any person who makes with scienter a false statement "reason-
ably calculated" to influence the investing public can be liable under rule 10b-5. Id. at
985 n.13.
272. See, e.g., O'Hara, Erosion of the Priority Requirement in Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921 (1984);
Rapp, Expanded Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act: When is a Seller Not
a Seller?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 445 (1977); Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securi-
ties Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnifica-
tion, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972); Comment, The Recognition of
Aiding and Abetting in the Federal Securities Laws, 23 Hous. L. REV. 821 (1986).
in connection with two things at once: if the fraud is in connection
with something other than a securities transaction, it is not in con-
nection with that securities transaction.273 Such a principle makes no
sense, and its use is unfounded in all circumstances. There is simply
no basis for saying, for example, that because fraud is in connection
with the mismanagement of a corporation, that fraud cannot be in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, as well.
b. Application Principle 2: Temporal proximity.
Several courts and commentators have suggested that the length of
time between the fraudulent conduct and the purchase or sale of se-
curities be taken into account in determining whether such conduct
is in connection with the securities transaction.274
The shorter the length of time between the fraud and the securities transac-
tion in question, the more likely the court is to find the "in connection with"
requirement satisfied. The purchase and the sale need not follow immediately
after the fraud, however, especially if the scheme is a continuing one or if the
delay is caused by the defendant's actions.
2 7 5
There is a certain allure to the suggestion, for when one thinks about
the concept of connection, one thinks in terms of proximity-primar-
ily spacial and conceptual, but also temporal. Using temporal prox-
imity to decipher the "in connection with" requirement is a mistake.
One can imagine any instance in which the "in connection with"
requirement is clearly satisfied-a classic category 1 case perhaps-
then lengthen the time between the fraudulent conduct and the
transaction. The "in connection with" requirement is no less satis-
fied. Just because the victim of the fraud does not make the
purchase soon after the fraud has occurred does not make 10b-5 inap-
plicable.276 Similarly, one can imagine a case in which the require-
ment is not satisfied-the deceptive shoe salesman/honest securities
salesman example from part I would suffice. The 10b-5 case is not
strengthened by hypothesizing near simultaneous fraud and securi-
ties sales.
The same is true of 10b-5 cases closer to the center of the spec-
trum. The connection between the fraud and the transaction is not
273. See, e.g., Hunt v. Robinson, 852 F.2d 786, 787 (4th Cir. 1988); Taylor v. First
Union Corp., 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988); O'Brien v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 60 (7th Cir. 1979); Natowitz v. Mehiman, 567 F. Supp. 942
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But
see Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (defendant's exclusive alternatives argument rejected by court).
274. See, e.g., Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 1986); Klausner v. Ferro, 604
F. Supp. 1188, 1196 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1986); A. JACOBS, supra
note 4, § 38.01, at 2-47; Note, supra note 251, at 1280.
275. See Note, supra note 251, at 1280.
276. Of course, as time goes by, the victim is less able to make a convincing case of
reliance, but that is a separate matter.
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heightened by temporal proximity. The principle has a surface ap-
peal, but it does not bear scrutiny.
c. Application Principle 3: Fraud in a face-to-face transaction that
induces retention of the securities, which are later sold at a loss,
is indistinguishable from fraud that induces an immediate
purchase or sale.
In several categories of cases, plaintiffs have alleged that the de-
fendant deceptively induced the plaintiff to retain a security, which
the plaintiff later sold at a loss. Courts are split on the question: is
the fraud alleged in connection with the later sale?277 The proper
answer is no, for at least two reasons.
First, in such a transaction, the perpetrator of the fraud is gener-
ally not the person to whom the sale is ultimately made. Section
10(b), properly interpreted, does not impose liability on defendants
who are not themselves purchasers or sellers, unless such liability
can be imposed on theories (e.g., aiding and abetting, respondeat su-
perior, expanded "seller" concept) unrelated to the "in connection
with" requirement.278
Second, even if section 10(b) is interpreted to impose liability on
non-trading defendants, the defendants should not be liable when
their fraud, induces retention unless the plaintiff can show that the
defendant, while committing the fraud, intended that the sale of the
security eventually be made. There can be no question that, if the se-
curity is never sold, 10b-5 is inapplicable since both section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 require a securities transaction. The section and the rule
are not concerned with investment decisions, but with investment de-
cisions that lead to action. If the defendant does not intend in com-
mitting the fraud that the transaction ultimately be made, his
liability in a "retention-then-sale" case would rest on a complete for-
tuity-whether the plaintiff decides to realize the loss or not. The
wrongdoing involved is the fraudulent inducement of retention,
which does not implicate section 10(b). What happens with the se-
curity afterwards is logically unrelated to the wrongful conduct.
Thus, it should not be deemed to be "in connection with" that
conduct.
277. Compare, e.g., Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F.
Supp. 260, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (not in connection with sale) with Feldberg v.
O'Connell, 338 F. Supp. 744, 746-47 (D. Mass. 1972) (contra) and Stockwell v. Reynolds
& Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (contra).
278. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
This sort of reasoning is implicit in the court's opinion in Bolger v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath.2 79 The plaintiffs were
partners in a limited partnership that ultimately became worthless,
resulting in an eventual sale of the plaintiff's interests.28 0 The plain-
tiffs alleged that they were induced by false assurances of the defend-
ants to retain their partnership shares. The court held, however, that
fraudulently induced retention, followed by an eventual sale, does
not satisfy the "in connection with" requirement.28 ' It pointed out
that it was irrelevant to the defendants in deceiving the plaintiffs,
whether the plaintiffs ultimately sold or not.282 "The plaintiffs' sale
here was not part of the defendants' overall scheme to defraud the
limited partners out of their investments. '"2 8 3
d. Application Principle 4: A defendant's deception should not be
deemed to be in connection with a purchase or sale of
securities unless the purpose of the fraud was
to effectuate a securities transaction.
In several categories discussed above, courts found relevant the
purpose of the defendant's deception. In category 1, the deception al-
ways has as its purpose the inducement of the securities transac-
tion.28 4 In category 2, courts are split on whether an issuer's liability
under 10b-5, when it makes statements about itself in the markets,
depends on whether the issuer intended to affect the trading in its
securities. 28 5  Even in the cases in which investors rely on
misstatements of third parties, courts often look to the defendant's
purpose in making the misstatements. 28 6 In the category 4 misman-
agement cases, the purpose of the defendant's acts has been a central
point of distinction.28 7 Of course, in the misappropriation theory, the
279. 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
280. The court assumed arguendo that there was a "sale" of the interests when the
limited partnership was ultimately dissolved. See Bolger, 381 F. Supp. at 266-67.
281. Id. at 266.
282. Id. at 267.
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 7, at 1292.
285. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Jabend, Inc. v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1339, 1343-44 (W.D.
Wash. 1986) ("in connection with" requirement not satisfied since fraud not calculated
to affect investors' decisions); Crofoot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1154, 1158-59
(E.D. Cal. 1976) ("in connection with" requirement satisfied since defendant's decep-
tion was calculated to influence investing public).
287. See Brown v. Ivie, 661 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1981) (where purpose of allegedly
deceptive acts was to force securities transaction, "in connection with" requirement
satisfied), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d
455, 467 (7th Cir.) (false promises of employment made to achieve sale of securities sat-
isfied "in connection with" requirement), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); Ketchum v.
Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1028 (3d Cir.) (where purpose of alleged deception was not to
cause securities transaction, "in connection with" requirement unsatisfied), cert. de-
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fact that the securities transaction was the sole purpose of the decep-
tion is of central importance to both courts28 8 and commentators. 28 9
Perhaps because of the pervasive character of this principle, com-
mentators consistently mention it when generally discussing the "in
connection with" requirement.290
The principle is a sound one; defendants in all categories should be
liable only if the fraud is committed with the purpose of facilitating
the securities trade. Two anomalies result if the defendant's purpose
is not a requirement. First of all, from the defendant's point of view,
the federal securities law implications of his bad conduct become
completely fortuitous. Rule 10b-5 liability would turn on events over
which the defendant has no control, and about which the defendant
does not care.
Perhaps more importantly, however, deceptive conduct which for-
tuitously results in a securities transaction does not comport with the
colloquial understanding of the concept of "securities fraud." In
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,291 the Supreme Court traced the history
of the concept of fraud and found that the notion implies some sort
of scienter-unwitting conduct is simply not fraud. Analogously, in-
tentional deception that fortuitously results in a securities trade
should not be deemed "securities fraud."
In each of the categories, except that involving the misappropria-
tion cases, a finding that the defendant intentionally committed de-
ception with the purpose of causing a securities trade to take place
should be sufficient to establish the requisite connection, at least
where the defendant is a buyer or seller of securities. That is, except
in the misappropriation cases and those instances in which the de-
fendant is neither a buyer nor a seller, satisfaction of the "purpose"
or "intent" principle should be both a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for finding the "in connection with" requirement satisfied.
As discussed below, the misappropriation theory raises special pol-
nied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1970)
(purchase or sale of securities must be subject or purpose of scheme).
288. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1982).
289. See, e.g., Aldave, supra note 242, at 377-78.
290. See, e.g., A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 38.01, at 2-49; Comment, supra note 251, at
496.
291. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
icy concerns. 292 However, the "purpose" principle is an insufficient
basis for finding the requisite nexus in misappropriation cases. If de-
ception is accomplished by telling an employer that one is not feeling
well, whereas in actuality, the employee is staying home to trade se-
curities with a personal computer, the purpose of the deception is ob-
viously to facilitate securities transactions, just as in the
misappropriation cases; but no one would be willing to say that the
deception is actionable under 10b-5. The difference between this sce-
nario and the misappropriation cases is that, in the latter, important
securities-related policies are implicated differently. Thus, courts
make a mistake in the misappropriation case if they focus on the
"purpose" principle; they should instead focus on matters of policy.293
e. Application Principle 5: Causation.
Without doubt, the most common principle stated as a guide for
courts in applying the "in connection with" requirement is the princi-
ple of causation. As became clear in examining the various categories
of "in connection with" cases, causation arises as a rationale, at least
implicitly, in nearly all the categories.2 94 Two questions must be ad-
dressed. First, should causation between the fraud and the securities
transaction be a necessary condition for finding the "in connection
with" requirement satisfied? Second, should causation be a sufficient
condition? The answers are, respectively, "generally yes" and "no."
Except in misappropriation cases, it is sensible to require that the
fraud have caused the transaction to take place. Otherwise, the two
phenomena-the fraud and the purchase or sale of securities-exist
together only coincidentally, either because they occur together in a
short span of time or because they happen to occur in the same fac-
tual setting. Neither coincidence should be the basis for liability
under a securities fraud statute.
In the misappropriation cases, causation (to the extent it is pres-
ent) is of a different type. Arguably, the deception does not cause the
transaction, since from the "victims'" point of view, the transactions
would occur even without the defendant's misappropriation. 295 On
the other hand, from the defendant's point of view, the deception
causes the transaction (at least in a "but for" sense), since the fraud
is necessary for and an intentional precursor to the securities transac-
tion. As mentioned above, however, this type of causation is weak to
the point of being meaningless. The deception in such cases is more
akin to necessary preparation for, rather than a cause of, the securi-
292. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
293. See infra note 326 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 82-247 and accompanying text.
295. This point is explored supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
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ties transaction. But again, the misappropriation cases raise entirely
different sorts of policy questions and must be treated differently.
As a sufficient condition for the satisfaction of the "in connection
with" requirement, causation clearly fails.296 Allowing mere causa-
tion ("the fraud caused the plaintiff to trade securities") to satisfy the
"in connection with" requirement would be counter to the require-
ment that the defendant be an actual purchaser or seller.297 Further,
it would require the rejection of the "intent" or "purpose" principle
already suggested as a necessary condition. 298
f Application Principle 6: Temporal sequencing.
Although there should be no requirement that the fraud precede
the securities transaction by only a short period of time,299 it makes
sense to require that the fraud at least not occur after the securities
transaction takes place. This is simply a corollary of the causation re-
quirement, and seems a pedestrian notion. However, courts find
themselves having to state it often, apparently because plaintiffs have
been sufficiently heartened by the expansive use of 10b-5 that they
have been willing to make the rather audacious argument that fraud
can be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities even
when the deception postdates the transaction.300
g. Application Principle 7: The more intervening steps which
exist between the fraud and the purchase or sale of
securities, the lesser is the connection between
the two.
In at least two cases, circuit courts have found it relevant to inquire
into the number of intervening steps between the deception and the
296. Accord Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir.)
("but for" causation insufficient), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
297. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 284-93 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988);
Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 1986); Shivers v. Amerco, 670 F.2d 826, 829-30
(9th Cir. 1982); Connors v. Lexington Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 434, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1987);
Citron v. Rollins Envtl. Serv., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 733, 737 (D. Del. 1986); Bosio v. Norbay
Sec., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1563, 1566 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Gulf Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
582 F. Supp. 1110, 1121 (D. Del. 1984); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1148
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Wolford v. Equity Resources Corp., 424 F. Supp. 670, 671 (S.D. Ohio
1976); Lester v. Preco Indus., 282 F. Supp. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Eisenstadt v.
Josephthal & Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,971, at
90,845 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1985).
purchase or sale of securities. In Ketchum v. Green,301 the court
found the "in connection with" requirement unsatisfied, in part be-
cause of the number of intervening acts that took place between the
fraud and the sale of securities.302 In Buffo v. Graddick,303 the court
found a state corollary of the 10b-5 "in connection with" requirement
satisfied where the transaction was only one step away from the
fraud.304
Such an inquiry may be appropriate in determining causation, but
as a separate consideration it adds nothing. If the court determines
that the fraud actually caused the securities transaction to occur, it
should not matter at all that there was a long chain of events be-
tween the two.
h. Application Principle 8: The incidental/essential distinction.
One of the most common inquiries made by courts in many catego-
ries of cases involves whether the purchase or sale of securities was
an "incidental" or "essential" part of the defendant's fraud, although
the phraseology used varies. 305 Commentators, too, are inclined to
make the distinction.306 In cases and commentary, it is sometimes
not clear whether the discussion is (a) inquiring whether the transac-
tion was a purpose for the fraud, (b) inquiring into the transactional
proximity between the fraud and the transaction, or (c) stating a sep-
arate principle.
If the distinction is used as a reformulation of the "purpose" or "in-
tent" requirement, it either adds nothing, or it adds too much. If
courts are using the distinction simply as an alternative formulation
of the "purpose" or "intent" requirement, it adds nothing and is a
less clear formulation. If, however, courts are suggesting that the de-
fendant must not only have intended that his deception cause the
301. 557 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
302. Id. at 1028.
303. 742 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1984).
304. Id. at 596-97.
305. See Taylor v. First Union Corp., 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988); Pross v. Katz, 784
F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 1986); Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930,
944 n.24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022,
1028 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d
1277, 1282 (2d Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 533 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir.), vacated, 429 U.S. 881
(1976); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 430 F.2d 355, 362 (2d
Cir. 1970) (Hays, J., dissenting), rev'd, 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Natowitz v. Mehlman, 567 F.
Supp. 942, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539, 543 (N.D.
Ill. 1970); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd,
430 F.2d 355, 362 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Lester v. Preco Indus., 282 F.
Supp. 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978
(1964); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
306. See, e.g., 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 38.01, at 2-49; Note, supra note 251, at
1280.
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transaction but also that causing the transaction was an "essential,"
in the sense of "dominant" or "primary," reason for the deception,
the suggestion is too strong. Intentional deception when buying or
selling securities is no less a matter of federal concern if the decep-
tion is really a means to another end as well. It makes no difference
from either the defendant's or victim's point of view.
If the distinction is made simply as a restatement of the principle
of transactional proximity, the comments below concerning that prin-
ciple are applicable.30 7 If, however, the incidental/essential distinc-
tion is used by courts or commentators as a separate consideration, its
use is a mistake. Although it has surface appeal, it adds nothing of
substance to the inquiry. Whether the securities transaction is a rela-
tively small part of a larger wrongdoing or is the very heart of the
wrongdoing makes no difference. In either case, the primary concern
addressed by the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws-
investor protection-is implicated.
i. Application Principle 9: If what is being alleged is a mere
breach of corporate fiduciary duties, the "in
connection with" requirement is not satisfied.
In the mismanagement cases, courts are fond of stating that the an-
tifraud provisions of the federal securities laws are directed at the
protection of investors and the integrity of the trading markets, not
internal corporate mismanagement.308 This statement is true.309
However, to derive from this statement the principle that an allega-
tion complaining about a mere breach of corporate fiduciary duties
does not allege a sufficient connection between the fraud and the
purchase or sale of securities is either to state a truism or to make a
mistake.
The principle becomes a truism if one focuses on the word "mere."
If a breach of state law fiduciary duties is the only allegation, it
hardly seems worth pointing out that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are
not implicated simply because the breach occurs in a corporation
with outstanding shares of securities.
307. See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
308. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971); Buffo v. Graddick, 742 F.2d 592, 596 (11th Cir. 1984); Ketchum v. Green, 557
F.2d 1022, 1028 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
309. The purposes behind the federal securities laws generally, and their antifraud
provisions specifically, are explored elsewhere. See Fletcher, Sophisticated Investors
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1133-36.
Those who put forth the proposition may mean by it something
more: that a breach of state fiduciary duty law that accompanies de-
ception, which would be deemed "in connection with" the purchase
or sale of securities, is less likely to be so deemed in a corporate
breach of fiduciary duty situation. The reasoning in such a principle
is misguided. If we have before us a case which, using appropriate
principles, we deem to involve fraud in connection with a securities
transaction, the connection cannot possibly be lessened by the mere
presence of additional state causes of action for fiduciary duty
breaches.
In the controversial part IV of the Supreme Court's decision in
Santa Fe Industries v. Green,310 the Supreme Court strongly sug-
gested that matters already covered by state corporation law are not
properly within the ambit of the private right of action under 10b-
5.311 The private right of action is a judicial creation and therefore
subject to judicial restriction in light of policy.312 Further, courts
may deem it unnecessary to allow private rights of action where a
perfectly good alternative remedy exists under state law. Nonethe-
less, for purposes of the "in connection with" requirement, there is
no conceptual justification for ignoring a connection that would
otherwise be found to exist when the fact pattern also involves a
state fiduciary duty breach s 13
j. Application Principle 10: Transactional proximity-eyeballing
the situation.
Given the lack of guidance provided by the statutory language, it is
not surprising if some courts and commentators seem to despair of
any ability to identify, articulate, and apply specific principles for de-
ciphering the "in connection with" requirement. The least guiding of
the limitation principles is "transactional proximity": the require-
ment that the fraud and the securities transaction exist in some un-
defined nexus relationship within a transaction.
Typically, in cases using this principle, the court merely states that
some sort of nexus is required-that the fraud and the transaction
must be linked sufficiently in the same transaction. The court then
310. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
311. Id. at 477-80.
312. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975); DMI
Furniture, Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co., 644 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
313. Accord Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1282 (2d Cir.), reh'g en
banc denied, 533 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 429 U.S. 881 (1976);
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1974); Popkin v.
Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 808 (5th Cir.
1970); Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872, 882 (5th Cir. 1970); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.,
320 F. Supp. 539, 543-44 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp.
21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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decides the case without articulating other more specific princi-
ples.314 In other words, the court "eyeballs" it. Such an approach
has obvious drawbacks. First, it offers little guidance to future deci-
sion makers, although that may be the point: the judges may be
making the statement that there is no extrapolation possible from
case to case.
More fundamentally, such an approach almost certainly masks a
more detailed thought process that the judges are not articulating.
There must be some mental process when a judge makes the deter-
mination that a given instance of fraud is or is not in connection with
a securities transaction. More reflection should make it possible for
judges to articulate those thought processes so that they may be sub-
jected to scrutiny both by the judge and by others.
In short, this principle is really an abdication of principled reason-
ing responsibility. It should be avoided.
k. Application Principle 11: To be "in connection with" a
purchase or sale of securities, the deception must
concern the merits of the security being
purchased or sold or the terms of the
transaction.
In 1981, in Rubin v. United States,3 15 the Supreme Court explicitly
reserved judgment on the question whether misrepresentations not
pertaining to the securities themselves can give rise to an action
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
3 16
Courts continue to be sharply divided on the question, which is often
perceived in 10b-5 cases as an inquiry concerning the "in connection
with" requirement.
314. See, e.g., First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1315 (5th Cir.
1977); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595 & n.18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974); Imperial Supply Co. v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp. 339, 362-
63 (N.D. Ohio 1976); cf Buffo v. Graddick, 742 F.2d 592, 596 (11th Cir. 1984) (degree of
"proximity" between fraud and transaction is one consideration); Rich v. Touche Ross
& Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). "At issue here is whether the allegedly
fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions were so proximately related either to a
purchase or a sale, as to be actionable as 'in connection with' such a transaction." Id.
(court then mentions causation); cf. also Jacobs, The Role of the Securities Exchange
Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Mismanagement, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
27, 43 (1973) (case-by-case decisionmaking necessary to determine if fraud and transac-
tion are "too attenuated"); Note, supra note 251, at 496-97 (degree of proximity within
the same transaction is one consideration).
315. 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
316. Id. at 429 n.6.
Three distinct lines of reasoning can be found in these cases. The
first holds that misrepresentation is not in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities unless it pertains to the securities them-
selves.317 The second modifies the first, allowing a plaintiff to go for-
ward on an allegation of misrepresentation concerning the securities
themselves or concerning other matters closely associated with the
transaction, such as the risks in purchasing on margin generally or
the course of dealing in the securities transaction. 318 The third
(made up primarily of pre-Ernst/Santa Fe/Blue Chip Stamps cases)
takes an expansive view of 10b-5, and refuses to limit the type of mis-
representation that can be in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.319
The only basis for resolving this conflict is to ask, as the court in
Bosio v. Norbay Securities, Inc. 320 suggested, whether this is the type
of misrepresentation the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws were designed to reach.32 1 Although there are serious dangers
normally inherent in interpreting texts in light of policy,322 where
the private right of action is a judicial creation and the text offers no
guidance whatsoever, courts are free to tailor the application of that
text to conform with broader policy concerns. 323 This means that
judging the propriety of this principle of limitation requires consider-
ation of the next principle, into which this one collapses.
317. See, e.g., 'Saxe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 789 F.2d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1986); Bennett
v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 313-14 (2d Cir. 1985); Head v. Head, 759 F.2d
1172, 1175 (4th Cir. 1985); Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); Nevitsky v. Manufacturers Hanover Broker-
age Serv., 654 F. Supp. 116, 119 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Boccicchio v. Smith Barney, Har-
ris, Upham & Co., 647 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Crummere v. Smith Barney,
Harris, Upham & Co., 624 F. Supp. 751, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
318. See, e.g., Taylor v. First Union Corp., 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988) (deception
must mislead plaintiff about value of company or in investment decision generally); In
re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litig., 796 F.2d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 1986) ("in
connection with" requirement not satisfied where deception did not relate to merits of
securities or any risk associated with them); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.,
764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir.) (deception may concern course of dealing), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 267 (1985); Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d
615, 619 (9th Cir.' 1981) (misrepresentations concerning risks of margin in declining
markets is fraud in connection with purchase of securities).
319. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 763 (5th Cir. 1974); Walling v. Beverly
Enter., 476 F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1973); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97
(2d Cir. 1967); see also T. HAZEN, supra note 22, § 13.6, at 119 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
320. 599 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
321. Id at 1567; see also Taylor v. First Union Corp., 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988)
("in connection with" requirement unsatisfied if goals of antifraud provisions not
furthered).
322. See Fletcher, supra note 44.
323. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975); DMI
Furniture, Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co., 641 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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1. Application Principle 12: The "in connection with"
requirement should be deemed satisfied if, but only if,
the fraud in question is of a type that
implicates one of the policies behind
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
Although the federal securities laws have several policy motiva-
tions,324 the antifraud provisions were designed to fulfill two policy
goals: protect buyers and sellers from being disappointed in their ex-
pectations about the transaction and, more systemically, protect the
securities markets from a failure of confidence that might result
from a perception of unfairness.3 25 In categories 1 through 4 and 6,
only the first policy is implicated directly; the second policy is ad-
vanced in such cases only by furthering the first. In the category 5
misappropriation cases, however, the second policy is arguably impli-
cated directly, while the first is arguably not implicated at all. For
these reasons, category 5 cases must be treated differently with re-
spect to this principle than the others.
Because in categories 1 through 4 and 6 the touchstone is the pro-
tection of buyers' and sellers' expectations, when examining the al-
leged misrepresentation, a court should ask: does the complaint
allege that due to deception by the defendant, the expectations of the
other party regarding the securities transaction were disappointed?
A further inquiry may be made as to whether each party received
what he expected from the securities transaction. Under such an
analysis, limiting the misrepresentations to the merits of the security
involved is too harsh. There are other investment expectations that
may be disappointed-for example, expectations about the risk of a
portfolio generally, or the way in which the transaction will be car-
ried out. Conversely, those cases that do not limit their analysis to
upholding expectations about the securities transaction go too far.
The misappropriation cases, however, raise different concerns. Be-
cause the deception in such cases is not directed at the party with
whom the defendant trades, the "uphold expectations" policy argua-
bly does not apply. Courts may, with more analysis than they gener-
ally undertake, determine that all investors have a legitimate
expectation that a rough parity of access to information will exist in
324. The purposes behind the federal securities laws are discussed more fully in
Fletcher, supra note 309, at 1133-36.
325. See id.; accord Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 300 F.
Supp. 1083, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
the securities markets. That question, which is beyond the scope of
this article, must be addressed more fully, however, before the "up-
hold expectations" policy can legitimately be applied in misappropria-
tion cases. Certainly Congress has not articulated clearly a view that
all investors should have equal access to information, and the matter
is one of controversy in the literature.326 It is unclear to what extent,
if any, a disparity of access to information is unfair or harms inves-
tors. Before the "uphold expectations" rationale can be used in the
misappropriation cases, the theoretical underpinnings should be ex-
plored more fully.
The same is true of the other motivating principle for the antifraud
provisions: the protection of the integrity of the markets. Before a
court may legitimately find that the misappropriation theory furthers
the policy by proscribing acts that injure the integrity of the markets,
the court should first resolve a question that is hotly debated: is the
market somehow harmed when someone uses an illegitimately ob-
tained informational advantage to trade? Again, before the policy is
used as a basis for the misappropriation theory, courts should be pre-
pared to explore the theoretical underpinnings more fully than they
do.
B. Matching Principles and Categories
Having looked at the various categories and having examined the
many principles that may be used therein, a return to the categories
is appropriate to resolve the question as to which considerations (i.e.,
principles) should guide a court in each type of case? Not surpris-
ingly, given the discussion above, different categories often require
different analyses.
1. Category 1: The Paradigmatic Face-to-Face Deception
Concerning the Merits of a Security
The "in connection with" requirement has never been problematic
for courts examining category 1 cases. Why such cases always satisfy
the "in connection with" requirement can be answered by the fact
that many of the restricting principles are satisfied in these cases.
The purpose of the deception is to cause the transaction to go
through,327 and it does cause the transaction to go through. 328 The
principle of temporal sequencing 32 9 is satisfied, and the deception
goes to the merits of the security being bought or sold.330 The victim
326. See, e.g., Aldave, supra note 242, at 378-80.
327. See supra notes 284-93 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 294-98 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 315-23 and accompanying text.
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is disappointed in his expectations concerning the transaction by be-
ing deprived through deception of that which he expected to receive.
Finally, the policies of the antifraud provisions are specificially aimed
at this type of transaction.33 1
2. Category 2: Misrepresentations by Issuers Who Are Not
Themselves Buyers or Sellers of Securities in the
Transaction
Because no person should be liable under 10b-5 unless he is either an
actual purchaser or seller or can be held liable under one of the col-
lateral theories (e.g., aiding and abetting),3 32 non-trading corporate is-
suers should not be subjected to liability at all except under one of
the collateral theories. But if courts persist to open such parties to
liability, certain application principles pertain. Causation alone is in-
sufficient and must be accompanied by an intent to cause investors to
alter their investment decisions on the basis of the deception.333
Even then, because of the policies supporting the antifraud provi-
sions, the defendant should not be liable except where the victim is
caused to be disappointed in his expectations regarding the securities
transaction.334
3. Category 3: Third Parties Who are Not Buyers or Sellers of
Securities
All the principles applicable in category 2 cases are equally applica-
ble in category 3 cases.
4. Category 4: The Mismanagement Cases
The principles of category 2 are also fully applicable in category 4
cases, but courts should be sensitive regarding two principles that are
tempting but which should not be used. First, as pointed out above,
the statement that "mere corporate mismanagement does not impli-
cate Rule 10b-5" is dangerous.335 It is either a truism or is false. In
either case, courts should not use it. Second, courts should eschew
the principle suggesting that intervening steps militate against find-
ing the requisite connection. 336
331. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 284-98 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
5. Category 5: The Misappropriation Cases
This category is, without doubt, the most vexing of the group. The
causation principle, which in other categories is a necessary condi-
tion, is of no use in the misappropriation cases. 337 The purpose/in-
tent rationale is useful-indeed used-but flawed and should be
eschewed.338 Application of the "in connection with" requirement to
misappropriation cases turns on how one perceives the policies of
trader protection and market integrity to play out in the misappro-
priation contexts. Courts should not jump to hasty conclusions con-
cerning those policies. Rather, they should contribute to the huge
(and growing) volume of scholarly literature on the question: is
there any harm or unfairness in someone trading on the basis of ill-
gotten, material, non-public information? Until that question is re-
solved, the misappropriation theory lacks sufficient theoretical un-
derpinnings to support it.
6. Category 6: The Conversion Cases
As noted above, in those cases in which securities are converted by
the defendant and later sold, the intent/purpose principle is of no
use; from the victim's point of view, the intent or purpose of the de-
fendant's act is wholly fortuitous.339 Causation is not present; the
conversion "causes" the later trade only in the very weak sense that
necessary preparation for any event causes the event itself.340 With
no deception concerning the purchase/sale transaction (i.e., the vic-
tim cannot claim that he was disappointed in his expectations con-
cerning that transaction, since the victim had no expectation about
the transaction at all) and no impact on the policies behind the an-
tifraud provisions (protection of buyers and sellers and protection of
trading markets),341 such conversion cases should never be deemed to
involve a deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties. The victim was deceived, but the deception is a matter of state
conversion law. The mere presence of securities should not implicate
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to sort through an intricately detailed
body of law to replace complete chaos with some order. At one level,
the topic of the article has been extremely narrow: the article has
been concerned with one particular clause from one administrative
337. See supra notes 235-37, 295-96 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
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rule promulgated under authority granted in one subsection of one of
the federal securities statutes. But on another level, the topic of this
article has been much broader: What should a court do when faced
with a statutory standard that offers nearly no guidance as to its ap-
plication? Legislative history is sometimes helpful, but sometimes it
is nonexistent. Even where it does exist, the limited original pur-
poses for which the statute was enacted may have been long over-
come by a jurisprudence whose substance is only formally related to
the text. Perhaps the methodology used here will be of help in deci-
phering other legal texts that seem incomprehensible.
Such situations cry out for a legislative solution. With the "in con-
nection with" requirement, Congress and the SEC have unfortu-
nately abdicated their legislative function to the courts. This should
be remedied. Congress must address the law of insider trading in a
coherent and comprehensive manner after full exposition of the pol-
icy concerns implicated. Congress should also make clear the rela-
tionship between federal securities fraud and deception undertaken
by corporations and their officers and directors. Ambiguity breeds
uncertainty, and uncertainty entails costs for the processes of capital
formation. Uncertainty also creates unfairness for defendants, who
(particularly in a criminal statute) should know in advance whether
what they do can result in federal securities law violations. As two
commentators recently suggested: "[E]ven a casual concern for the
presentation of civil liberties and due process compels the conclusion
that persons accused of criminal offenses should be given ample no-
tice of precisely what conduct will rise to the sanctions that flow
from them. '' 342 Congress, not the courts, should be dictating what is
meant by the proscription of fraud in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities.
342. Pitt & Shapiro, The Revised Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1988: A Leg-
islative Remedy for a Problem that Persists, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 7, 8 (1988).

